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On the Internet there are publishers (the supply side) who provide free contents (e.g.,
news) and services (e.g., email) to attract users. Publishers get paid by selling ad dis-
playing opportunities (i.e., impressions) to advertisers. Advertisers then sell products
to users who are converted by ads. Better supply side revenue allows more free con-
tent and services to be created, thus, beneﬁting the entire online advertising ecosystem.
This thesis addresses several optimisation problems for the supply side.
When a publisher creates an ad-supported website, he needs to decide the percent-
age of ads ﬁrst. The thesis reports a large-scale empirical study of Internet ad density
over past seven years, then presents a model that includes many factors, especially the
competition among similar publishers, and gives an optimal dynamic ad density that
generates the maximum revenue over time. This study also unveils the tragedy of the
commons in online advertising where users’ attention has been overgrazed which re-
sults in a global sub-optimum.
After deciding the ad density, the publisher retrieves ads from various sources,
including contracts, ad networks, and ad exchanges. This forms an exploration-
exploitation problem when ad sources are typically unknown before trail. This prob-
lem is modelled using Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP), and
the exploration efﬁciency is increased by utilising the correlation of ads. The proposed
method reports 23.4% better than the best performing baseline in the real-world data
based experiments. Since some ad networks allow (or expect) an input of keywords,
the thesis also presents an adaptive keyword extraction system using BM25F algorithm
and the multi-armed bandits model. This system has been tested by a domain service
provider in crowdsourcing based experiments.
If the publisher selects a Real-Time Bidding (RTB) ad source, he can use reserve
price to manipulate auctions for better payoff. This thesis proposes a simpliﬁed game
model that considers the competition between seller and buyer to be one-shot insteadAbstract 4
of repeated and gives heuristics that can be easily implemented. The model has been
evaluated in a production environment and reported 12.3% average increase of rev-
enue. The documentation of a prototype system for reserve price optimisation is also
presented in the appendix of the thesis.Acknowledgements
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Introduction
Online advertising is one of the fastest growing areas in the IT industry. Over the past
11 years, its revenue has increased from $6.0 billion (2002) to $42.8 billion (2013),
with a compound annual growth rate of 18.0% [1]. The display-related advertising,
which has been set as the background of this thesis, totalled $12.8 billion in 2013, with
a 7.0% increase from 2012 [1].
In academia research, online advertising is often referred to as computational ad-
vertising to emphasise its various core elements such as information retrieval, data
mining, machine learning, and microeconomics. It has received notable attention from
both industry and academia in recent years [2, 3, 4]. However, it is still a relatively new
sub-discipline and requires good ﬁeld knowledge, such as terminology and business
model, to understand its unique challenges. To make the thesis easier to understand,
a list of terminology and explanation has been included in Appendix A. To my best
knowledge, such a list has not been found in the research literature.
From a research perspective, the online advertising could be generally categorised
as sponsored search where a user query explicitly describes the intention, and dis-
play advertising where queries are absent and users’ interests have to be inferred from
browsing histories. User queries are usually given a very high weight in sponsored
search because they directly show what users are looking for. Based on queries and
other factors, ads are displayed along with search results [5] on the pages of search
engines like Google.
Apart from user queries, there are other factors making sponsored search and dis-
play advertising different: 1) In sponsored search, ads are usually limited to some given
formats. In general search engines like Google, it is one line text for the title, one line1.1. Real-Time Bidding 17
for the URL, two lines for the description, and possibly some extensions like a phone
number [6]. In product search engines like Amazon and Ebay, images and more details
of the product could be included in the ads but the formats are still limited;
2) The Cost Per Click (CPC) [7] pricing model and Generalised Second Price
auction [8] (where the winner is charged based on quality scores and the second highest
bid) are usually the standard in sponsored search;
3) Sponsored search usually has a centralised structure where publishers (i.e.,
search engines) take almost full control of auctions and ranking, because they have
full knowledge of advertisers and their campaigns [8].
On the contrary, display ads have much more ﬂexible formats [9], including vari-
ous sizes, animation, video clip, sound, and even interactive features. Impressions (an
opportunity to display an ad to a user once) in display advertising are mostly sold us-
ing the Cost Per Mille (CPM) pricing model. Mille, which represents 1000, has been
used to make ﬁgures easier to read and write because the cost for a single impression
is usually low. Display advertising has been widely adopted by online publishers who
provide contents (e.g., news, blogs, product comparison) and services (e.g., email, do-
main names, storage and hosting) to users for free and reimburse the running cost by
advertising revenue.
In this thesis, online display advertising has been set as the background and vari-
ous optimisation problems have been discussed for online publishers (the supply side).
These problems include determining the number of ad placements of a website (ad den-
sity), pulling ads from different sources (ad selection), and optimising reserve price in
Real-Time Bidding (RTB) auctions. These problems have been proposed to follow the
typical life cycle of an ad-supported website while recognising the uprising program-
matic buying trend (i.e., impressions are sold more automatically and intelligence and
optimisation are more needed than ever). Therefore, they are meaningful and helpful
to most of the publishers’ (the supply side) businesses.
1.1 Real-Time Bidding
First of all, the structure and history of online display advertising is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1.1. Before the emergence of Real-Time Bidding (RTB) in 2009 (i.e., announce-
ment of support by major ad exchanges [10]), the display advertising market was1.1. Real-Time Bidding 18
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Figure 1.1: A brief illustration of the history and structure of online display advertising. Ad
networks were created to aggregate advertisers and publishers. Ad exchanges were
designed to resolve the unbalance of demand and supply in ad networks. Pre-
mium advertisers and publishers now prefer to work with ad exchanges through
Demand-Side Platform (DSP) and Supply-Side Platform (SSP) to take the advan-
tage of Real-Time Bidding (RTB). The arrows with a number describe the process
of RTB: an impression is created and then passed to ad exchanges; advertisers are
contactedthroughDSPs; advertiserschoosetobuythirdpartydataoptionally. Then
following reversed path, bids are returned to the ad exchange, then the SSP or ad
network, and winner’s ad will be displayed to the user on the publisher’s website.
The link between SSP and data exchange, as well as those among ad exchanges,
are potentially useful however not widely adopted in the current marketplace.
mainly divided by contracts between advertisers and publishers (since 1994) and ad
networks which provide demand and supply aggregation (since 1996). The contracts
pre-sell impressions as many as possible at a high price and publishers have to nego-
tiate and make deals with advertisers directly, c.f. Block I in Figure 1.1. Advertisers
usually propose to buy a certain amount of impressions from some given placements,
regardless of the identities of users, when and how many times they have seen the ad,
and so on. The purchase is totally about impressions and relies on the reputation of the
publisher and reported audience proﬁles [11, 12, 13]. At the other end, the publisher
needs to guarantee the delivery of impressions that have been agreed upon, otherwise a1.1. Real-Time Bidding 19
penalty fee would be incurred [14, 15]. The pricing model used in contracts are mostly
CPM. With these contracts, advertisers usually have little control over the audience,
thus, it is more difﬁcult to deploy goal-driven campaigns (e.g., booking a ticket) than
brandingones(e.g., announcinganewproduct). Acampaignreferstoadvertisingeffort
within a period. The goal-driven campaigns are easier to execute when audience data
is available (e.g., music-lovers are more likely to buy concert tickets). These contracts
are sometimes called guaranteed deliveries [16].
Usually, contracts cannot sell all available impressions because it is almost impos-
sible to predict future trafﬁc volume and publishers tend to be conservative to avoid
penalty of under-delivery. To sell those remnant impressions, ad networks are created.
With ad networks, publishers register placements (a block on a webpage that is used
to show ads) and offer impressions from these placements for sale. Impressions are
largely sold using the second price auction mechanism [17] in ad networks. Advertis-
ers (or their delegates) also register with ad networks to participate in auctions. C.f.
Block II in Figure 1.1. However, the impressions in ad networks are non-guaranteed,
as opposed to premium contracts.
It is then the ad networks’ responsibility to understand the webpage and the user,
and to select advertisers based on their pre-deﬁned targeting rules. The knowledge
of webpage is usually referred to as contextual information [18], where ad networks
crawl, parse, and extract keywords that summarise the target. Advertisers bid on these
keywords which is very similar to sponsored search [19, 20, 21, 22]. A more advanced
approach is to learn a model including various features of webpages, which could then
be used to compute a relevance score of advertisers’ targeting criteria [23, 24, 25]. The
knowledge of users is usually referred to as behaviour information, where ad networks
utilise the browsing history of users to infer interests, as well as geographical locations,
local times, etc., for target matching [26, 27, 28].
In ad networks advertisers mostly adopt the Cost Per Click (CPC) or Cost Per
Acquisition (CPA) pricing models where they only pay when certain goal is achieved.
These choices reduce their risks, so are good for goal-driven campaigns. But since
many publishers’ inventories are sold using CPM, it is ad networks’ responsibility to
optimise for getting maximum clicks or conversions. To take the measurement of per-
formance into account ad networks usually use the Generalised Second Price auction1.1. Real-Time Bidding 20
(GSP) [8] which allow applying bid biases (e.g., the quality score [29]) that usually
weight the historical Click-Through Rate (CTR) or Conversion Rate (CVR) heavily.
When there were more and more ad networks, a problem led to the birth of ad ex-
changes: the excessive impressions in some ad networks. It is preferable to have more
demand than supply because intense competition leads to higher revenue of both ad net-
works and publishers. However, when there are plenty of impressions unsold, ad net-
works try hard to ﬁnd buyers. Besides, a common practice for advertisers is to register
with multiple ad networks to ﬁnd cheap inventories, or at least to ﬁnd enough impres-
sions within their budget constraints. They have only found that managing numerous
channels is difﬁcult and inefﬁcient (e.g., how to split the budget). Ad exchanges, like
Google AdX, Yahoo! Right Media, Microsoft Ad Exchange, AppNexus, etc. have
been created to address this problem by connecting hundreds of ad networks together,
c.f. Block III in Figure 1.1. Advertisers now have a higher chance to locate enough
impressions with preferred targeting rules; publishers may receive higher proﬁt, too,
because of more potential bidders.
The most-signiﬁcant feature introduced by ad exchanges is Real-Time Bidding
(RTB), which queries bidding systems (advertisers) for responses for every impression.
Along with the query, ad exchanges forward metadata of the webpage and the user.
The exposure of this metadata enables advertisers to switch from the inventory-centric
to user-centric optimisation. There are also noteworthy attempts to introduce concepts
from ﬁnance market [30]. These attempts will make the ad exchange more mature and
attractive. It is also worth noting that ad exchanges are getting popular with branding
campaigns, too, partly because of the possibility of locating cheap impressions on good
quality websites.
When advertisers want to take advantage of RTB, they work with third party plat-
form that are usually referred to as Demand Side Platform (DSP). DSPs are delegates
of advertisers that answer bidding requests and optimise campaigns at the impression-
level. Comparing with ad networks, the advantages of using DSPs are: 1) advertisers
do not need to manage their registration with many ad networks; 2) they can optimise
at a ﬁner granularity and a higher frequency because of local impression logs instead
of aggregated reports from ad networks; 3) DSPs are also more customisable to better
suit advertisers’ goals.1.1. Real-Time Bidding 21
Figure 1.2: The summarised process of Real-Time Bidding advertising. Major entities are
coloured in blue where processes are transparent. One iteration usually ﬁnishes
in less than 100 ms to achieve users’ satisfaction.
At the other end, Supply Side Platforms (SSPs) have been created to serve pub-
lishers. Similarly, SSPs provide a central management console with various tools for
publishers’ ultimate goal: the yield maximisation. For example, SSPs allow publishers
to set reserve prices on a group of impressions. These impressions are usually con-
straint by geographical location, time of day, or even particular auction winners. Some
SSPs also allow publishers to have a preference over buyers through bid bias [31].
In Figure 1.1 arrows with a number describe the simpliﬁed process of RTB:
1. An impression is created on publisher’s website;
2. The bidding request is sent to ad exchanges through ad network or SSP;
3. The ad exchanges query DSPs for advertisers’ bids;
4. The DSP could contact data exchanges for 3rd party user data;
5. The bid is generated and submitted; winner will be selected at ad exchanges,
then at SSP. Following the reversed path the winner’s ad will be displayed on
publisher’s website to the speciﬁc user.
This process is also summarised in Figure 1.2.1.2. Supply Side Optimisation 22
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Figure 1.3: A simpliﬁed illustration of the cash ﬂow in online display advertising. Users spend
time and focus on websites to receive free contents and services. Their browse
impressionsaregeneratedandsoldtoadvertiserswithorwithoutintermediaries(ad
networks & exchanges). Advertisers buy impressions to show ads of their products
and services to users. When users convert (persuaded to buy), advertisers receive
revenue.
1.2 Supply Side Optimisation
As shown in Figure 1.3, publishers usually run a two-sided business. On one hand,
they provide free contents (e.g., news, reviews, and answers) and services (e.g., email,
maps, and various online tools) to attract users whose browsing activity in turn gen-
erates impressions. Impressions are sold to advertisers directly or via intermediaries
(ad networks & exchanges). Publishers use ad revenue to compensate the running cost.
Therefore, optimisations for publishers are not only crucial to their business, but also
highly related to the health and diversity of the whole Internet.
This thesis addresses several supply side optimisation problems within the context
of RTB, where advertisers and publishers are both given the maximum freedom at the
ﬁnest granularity: the impression-level. Speciﬁcally, these problems are discussed:
1. How many ads should be displayed on the website?
2. Which ad sources should be used?
3. What is the optimal reserve price in RTB auctions?
By answering these questions, several important parts of supply side optimisation are
covered. An overview and connections are illustrated in Figure 1.4.1.2. Supply Side Optimisation 23
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Figure 1.4: An overview of optimisation problems in this thesis and their connections.
1.2.1 Ad Density
The ﬁrst question could be interpreted as the ad density problem. When a publisher
creates a website, he needs to decide how many ads (i.e., the ad density ) to put on
at each time step to generate the maximum payoff R, usually under the assumption
of users’ preference over ads. Many other factors also need to be considered, includ-
ing: the unit payoff c, running cost k, website trafﬁc x, and competition with other
publishers providing similar contents or services.
Chapter 3 studies the ad density problem both empirically and theoretically and
shows that ads on the Internet are overcrowded and users’ attention has been over-
grazed. Economically this is described as the tragedy of the commons [32] due to the
publishers’ competition. The chapter presents the ﬁrst large-scale empirical study of
display ad density evolution over the last seven years. By web crawling and linking to-
gether datasets from multiple sources (unit payoff, websites, users’ interest segments,1.2. Supply Side Optimisation 24
daily page-views, archival and current webpages, and ad slots), for the ﬁrst time, the
general increasing trend of display ad density for most websites has been unfolded;
various factors that affect the ad density decisions have been unveiled, too. The chapter
then presents a mathematical model with carefully designed objective and state transi-
tion functions to optimise ad density. The model is constructed based on ﬁndings from
the empirical study and solved by using game theory [33] and control theory [34]. The
solution from the model nicely matches ﬁndings from the empirical study.
1.2.2 Ad Selection
The second question could be interpreted as the ad selection problem. After determin-
ing the ad density and setting up the website template, the publisher needs to decide
where to get ads from. Often there are plenty of choices including ad networks, ad
exchanges, and direct contracts. Chapter 4 proposes a Partially Observable Markov
Decision Process (POMDP) based model [35] to ﬁnd the best selection strategy .
Bayes’ theorem is used to update the expected payoff X of different ads and utilise
their correlations , so that the expected payoff of any candidates could be updated
even if it is not selected. The objective is to maximise the cumulative payoff within T.
After deriving belief update equations both exact solution using value iteration and
approximate solution using multi-armed bandits are presented. The experiments show
that with correlated belief update the exploration speed increases, and the ad revenue is
uplifted (23.4% better than the best performing baselines) using real-world data.
1.2.3 Reserve Price
The third question could be interpreted as the reserve price optimisation problem. The
second price auction [17] is widely used in RTB auctions where the winner pays the
second highest bid, or the minimum value (usually one cent) if he is the only bidder.
When sending bid requests to selected ad exchanges, publishers are allowed to set
a reserve price (also known as the hard ﬂoor or the ﬂoor price) in these auctions as
the minimum value [36]. Therefore, it could potentially increase the revenue if it is
between the ﬁrst and the second highest bids, when the winner has to pay the reserve
price instead of the second highest bid.
For each auction, suppose there are bids b1  b2    bK. With a reserve price
, the preferable case is b1    b2 where the winner has to pay    b2 more than a1.2. Supply Side Optimisation 25
second price auction without a reserve. However, the publisher has to take the risk of
auction failure that gives zero revenue when the reserve price is above the highest bid,
i.e.,  > b1.
Reserve price optimisation has been used for sponsored search and been well stud-
ied in that context [37, 38]. However, comparing with sponsored search and contextual
advertising, this problem in the RTB context is less understood yet more critical for
publishers because: 1) Bidders have to submit a bid for each impression, which mostly
is associated with user data that is subject to change over time. This, coupled with
practical constraints such as the budget, campaigns’ life time, etc. makes the theoreti-
cal result from optimal auction theory not necessarily applicable and further empirical
study is required to conﬁrm its optimality from the real-world system; 2) In RTB, an
advertiser is facing nearly unlimited supply and the auction is almost done in last sec-
ond, which encourages frequent and dynamic budget reallocation to avoid high-cost ad
placements. This could imply the loss of bid volume over time if an incorrect reserve
price is used.
Chapter 5 reports the ﬁrst empirical study and live test of the reserve price opti-
misation problem in an operational environment. The results suggest that the proposed
game theory based ONESHOT algorithm performed the best and the superiority (12.3%
on average) is signiﬁcant in most cases.
The study of this thesis is highly relevant to the online advertising industry. With
sponsorship from UCL Advances, the implementation of the reserve price optimisa-
tion system is included in Appendix B by providing infrastructure requirement, code
samples, and documentation.
1.2.4 Contributions
The contributions of the thesis are three-fold. First, it solves three important problems
for the supply side in online display advertising. For ad density, the thesis develops,
solves, and analyses the model under different circumstances by applying the optimal
control theory and game theory. The consideration of publishers’ competition is novel
and has not been addressed before. For ad selection, a POMDP model and correlated
belief update are used to ﬁnd the optimal choice with accelerated exploration. This is
the ﬁrst time that POMDP model and correlated belief update have been used in such1.3. Thesis Structure 26
context. For reserve price, effective heuristics have been derived from a simpliﬁed
game model between the publisher and the auction winner. Such innovative modelling
and discussion of limitation of optimal auction theory in RTB have not been seen in the
research literature. Most importantly, by solving these problems, the presented work
increases the publishers’ revenue which beneﬁts the entire ad ecosystem.
Second, there are several empirical studies in the thesis, especially the ad density
evolution for the Internet in recent years (c.f. Section 3.2), and characteristics of RTB
auctions (c.f. Section 5.2. It is expected that players in online advertising ecosystem
recognise these ﬁndings and adjust their activities accordingly, and maintain a healthier
online advertising ecosystem.
Last but not least, the thesis describes the implementation of a reserve price opti-
misation prototype system in detail. This helps the interested publishers or technology
providers to get hands on this optimisation quickly.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The thesis is structured as follows.
A survey of related works is provided in Chapter 2. It discusses the general re-
search problems of computational advertising including the demand side bidding op-
timisation. The detailed discussion of related works of each problems is split into
individual chapter.
The ad density optimisation is studied in Chapter 3. First a large-scale empirical
study on Internet ad density evolution in recent years is presented, which unveils many
interesting ﬁndings including the relationship of ad density with website categories,
unit payoff price, web trafﬁc, and competition. Based on these relationships a dynamic
model is proposed and solved for the optimal ad density in the planning horizon using
control theory and game theory. By comparing cases with and without competition, the
proposed model shows the tragedy of the commons in online display advertising.
The ad selection problem is studied in Chapter 4. A POMDP model is built for dy-
namic selections and solved by using value iteration and multi-armed bandits models.
Experiments based on real-world payoff time series data conﬁrm the beneﬁts of cor-
related belief update. In this chapter, a toy example is provided to help understanding
the belief update process; an adaptive keyword extraction system is provided to help1.3. Thesis Structure 27
manipulating the ad source by supplying different keywords when possible.
Followed by a large-scale empirical study of RTB auctions, the reserve price opti-
misation problem is studied in Chapter 5. Based on the recognition of bidders’ lifetime
and bidding pattern, heuristics are derived from a simpliﬁed game model and approve
its effectiveness in online experiments.
At last, the thesis gives conclusions and discusses future work. Additionally, a list
of terminology of computational advertising is given in Appendix A. The description
of a reserve price optimisation prototype system is given in Appendix B.Chapter 2
Related Works
In each chapter the related works have been discussed in details. This chapter sum-
marised the research works of computational advertising and other aspects of the sup-
ply side optimisation problem. Around the topic of supply side revenue optimisation
there is good research effort in recent years. For example, there is rich literature on ads
scheduling especially when guaranteed and non-guaranteed deliveries are both avail-
able [39, 40, 14, 41, 42]; choosing the pricing models [43, 44, 45]; and the reserve
price optimisation [38, 37, 46, 47]. The perishable feature of impressions has been
addressed in [48]. The paper suggests showing publishers’ own ads when impressions
cannot be sold. The authors of [49, 30, 50] propose to sell impressions in advance for
better planning.
Besides, user modelling has been an important topic in information retrieval and
computational advertising research. In [51] the author study the sponsored items in
recommendation systems and conclude that the decision will be largely based on users’
preference. When there are competing publishers they will try to make the sponsorship
more exclusive. In [52] a users’ preference model over online advertising is studied
and authors break the causes of avoidance of ads into three parts: perceived goal im-
pediment, perceived ad clutter, and prior negative experience. The work of Chapter 3
recognises the avoidance or aversion of display ads; however, following the common
industrial practice, the proposed model do not control the content of ads; thus, the
change of users’ preference over different ads is not modelled. Interestingly, in [53] the
authors report that ads that match both website content and are obtrusive do worse at
increasing purchase intent than ads that do only one or the other.2.1. Inventory Management 29
2.1 Inventory Management
Inventory management is a well-studied topic for the supply side optimisation. An
interesting aspect of ad inventory management is to ﬁnd the optimal pricing models.
The CPM and CPC models are compared in [54]. In [44], the study concludes that a
combination of these two pricing models could be the most optimal under particular
constraint. The same choice problem is studied in [43]. However, the author concludes
that the optimal choice for a price taking publisher is either CPM or CPC but not a
combination. Similar conclusion is reported in [45], in which the competition between
two models is discussed but limited to a static setting: a single time step of planning
horizon. In Chapter 4, the goal is similar to those papers since the target is to ﬁnd
optimal ad sources. However, the proposed model is focused on Real-Time Bidding
setting which provides more ﬂexibility (the publisher could choose a source for every
impression); the correlation of ads is also used to accelerate the discovery process. For
instance, different from [43] no assumption is made on market elasticity; neither the
publisher is constraint to a contract-ﬁrst setup [40].
Another aspect of inventory management is ad scheduling with the constraint of
geometrical features of website, uncertainty of advertisers, and available ad inventory
(impressions) [39, 14, 55]. If the publisher fails to deliver promised impressions a
good-will penalty would be incurred. In [55] the ad scheduling problem is modelled in
video games and a dynamic algorithm is developed. When considering pricing models
publishers need to understand the webpage content and user preferences to achieve a
better scheduling. Because displaying ads may not earn the publisher anything if ads
are not relevant or users are not interested, therefore, no clicks. Traditionally, optimis-
ing matching between webpages and ads belongs to the ﬁeld of contextual advertising
research [24, 19]. In [24] a system utilising both semantic and syntactic features is pro-
posed to address the problem. Similarly the correlation of user-ad (behaviour targeting)
is studied in [56, 25], focusing on improving advertising effectiveness by modelling at-
titude and feedback from users. The work of Chapter 4 can be consider as an extension
of the above works. The contextual matching can be used as a prior belief in our model
and it can be updated and veriﬁed using our update formulas sequentially.
In recent years, programmatic guarantee (sometimes called programmatic direc-
t/reserve/premium) has gained much attention [57]. It is essentially an allocation and2.1. Inventory Management 30
pricing engine for publishers that brings the automation into the selling of guaranteed
contracts. A weighted assignment algorithm is studied in [41] where the publisher is
assumed to be interested not only in fulﬁlling the guaranteed contracts but also in de-
livering well-targeted impressions to advertisers (due to the free disposal effects). This
work actually investigates a matching problem of guaranteed impressions. The allo-
cation of impressions between guaranteed and non-guaranteed channels is discussed
in [58] where the publisher may act as a bidder who bids for guaranteed contracts.
Therefore, RTB bids have to be high enough otherwise the impression would be allo-
cated to guaranteed contracts. Stochastic control techniques are used by [59] to solve
the similar problem. For a given price of impression, the publisher can quickly decide
whether to send it to ad exchanges or to assign it to an advertiser with a reservation.
The total revenue from ad exchanges and reservations are then maximised. In [14],
the publisher can dynamically select which guaranteed buy requests to accept and then
delivers the guaranteed impressions. The model considers the uncertainty in buy re-
quests and website trafﬁc in the revenue maximisation. To price guaranteed contracts
containing the bulk of impressions, the work of [16] discusses two algorithms based on
the users’ visits to the webpages. The revenue is then maximised for the given demand.
Cancellation has been discussed in [60, 49] where the publisher can cancel the
guaranteed contracts with advertisers by paying a penalty. Publisher thus has a lot of
ﬂexibility in the selling but there exist speculators in the game who pursue the penalty
only. Such mechanisms are similar to the over-selling booking systems of ﬂight tick-
ets[61]. Adoptioncontractsdiscussedby[62,63,30], ontheotherhand, areadvertiser-
focused guaranteed contracts. They are a kind of special guaranteed contracts because
advertisers are allowed to pay a certain premium fees in advance to exchange for the
priority buying right (but not the obligation) of inventories in the future. In [63, 30],
advertisers can choose a combined payment scheme in online advertising. For exam-
ple, paying by CPC in display advertising or paying by CPM in sponsored search. The
introduction of ad options encourages the exploration of statistical arbitrage. However,
it is left to the future works.2.2. Bidding Optimisation 31
2.2 Bidding Optimisation
It is equally important to follow the demand side research effort because the advertising
market is naturally made of buyers and sellers and they compete. The bidding optimi-
sation has been one of the most important demand side topics in the computational
advertising research [64, 65, 66, 58, 67, 68], especially in the sponsored search context
[8, 69, 70, 71]. Because of its complexity, most of the works in the research literature
only focus on a part of the problem. For example, much attention has been paid on
click-through rate (CTR) prediction in the sponsored search context [72, 73, 74, 75],
wherealgorithmspredictthetheprobabilityofclickeventsgiventheadandthecontext.
This prediction is than used in ranking bids in the Generalised Second Price auctions
(GSP). Due to the nature of sponsored search, keywords (queries) are usually the factor
considered ﬁrstly and put heavy weight on. In [72] keywords are clustered by relevancy
to make conﬁdent predictions based on historical data. The authors of [76] use logistic
regression and various features of ads to predict CTR, and discuss its variations to pre-
dict term-CTR and related-term-CTR. In [77] decision rule based regression model is
learned to solve the prediction problem. Some works also consider behavioural target-
ing to improve the performance. In [73] uses’ intentions inferred from query features
and search engine result pages are introduced in the prediction model. An important
ﬁnding is that number of ads and rank of ads affect the CTR, too. Later in [78] users’
demographic-based features (age, gender, etc.) and user-speciﬁc features (interaction
with ads) are introduced in the prediction model. These works have unveiled the impor-
tance of audience data, however, these features are not comparable with the complexity
of user segments in RTB.
Considering CTR (conversion rate in RTB) alone could result in less effective bid-
ding algorithms. In [67] the authors propose a bidding function linear to the predicted
conversion probability of the inventory. That is, if showing an ad on a particular piece
of inventory doubles the probability of conversion over some random inventory, the
bid price should be twice the average bid price as well. An advantage of such bidding
function is not requiring knowledge of campaign’s base conversion rate or the private
value distribution. The limitation of such linear bidding strategy has been discussed
and validated in [79].
Bid landscape forecasting is anther important aspect of bidding optimisation. Here2.2. Bidding Optimisation 32
algorithms are expected to predict the number of impressions if bidding X on targeting
combination Y. Again in sponsored search, the targeting rule primarily focuses on pre-
determined keywords. In [80] both a linear regression model and an iterative approx-
imation are represented. It has also been discussed in the display advertising context
in [81] using divide-and-conquer approach: ﬁrstly bid distribution is estimated from
samples using gradient boosting decision trees; then campaign-level bid distribution is
constructed using a mixture of log-normal model from the sample-level distributions.
Other factors affecting a bidding algorithm include budget constraint, campaign’s
live period (which effectively translates to the planning horizon), and peer competition.
In [82, 83] authors propose to calculate a bid allocation plan in planning horizon (could
be inﬁnite). It is especially interesting since it breaks down the problem into click pre-
diction and market prediction (the estimated position if bidding X at hour Y). Samples
to train the model need to be purchased on the market using real money.
In fact, one can easily argue that since search engines design bidding algorithms
as well as host auctions, the objective function could be diverted to optimising the
overall revenue for the search engine [84, 85, 86, 87, 88], instead of performance of
each individual advertiser’s campaigns.
In the display advertising context, bidding algorithms are not constrained by pre-
determined keywords and usually use CPM pricing (ranking) models. In [58] the au-
thors propose an algorithm that learn winning bids distribution from full or partial in-
formation of auctions. The algorithm then makes bidding decisions to achieve the best
delivery (number of impressions) within the budget constraint.Chapter 3
Ad Density Optimisation
Publishers (including owners of websites, apps, blogs, videos, etc.) are an important
part of online advertising ecosystem. Many of them choose to provide content and ser-
vices for free and seek compensation by showing display ads or commercially intended
contents to users. Display advertising, as one of the primary sources of revenue for
online publishers, is becoming more and more popular in recent years with the growth
of programmatic advertising, especially the Real-Time Bidding (RTB) [1] because it
enables publishers to sell their inventories together with audience data and as such,
largely increase the value of the impressions.
However, it is common that users complain about seeing too many ads that are
distracting or even annoying [89]. To my best knowledge, there is no existing research
work that measures the number of ads online, their evolution over years, or if the num-
ber of ads is reasonable. This motivates the study both empirically and theoretically.
This chapter presents the ﬁrst-of-its-kind large-scale empirical study of display ad den-
sity evolution over recent years. To understand the ﬁndings from this study, a model is
presented that optimises ad density for a given website, or several competing websites.
Variations of the model and their implications are also discussed later.
In this thesis, ad density is deﬁned to be the percentage of ads on a webpage. More
precisely, it is the area of all ad slots divided by the area of the whole webpage. Note
that pop-ups are ignored as they are getting less popular and blocked by default. For
example, in Figure 3.1 ads are marked by red rectangles; the ad density of the same
webpage has increased rapidly from less than 1.0% in 2010 to around 18.0% in 2013.
It makes more sense using the percentage instead of the number of ad slots or their
aggregated area (these are also reported in the chapter) since long webpages usually34
contain more information thus deserve more ad slots. This chapter uses the concept
ﬁrst screen ads, too. These ads are displayed by default (without the need of scrolling)
when a modern browser opens the webpage. To be more precise, an ad is considered
to be in the ﬁrst screen if the vertical position of its lower border is within 1000 pixels
from the top of the webpage. The width of the browser has been set to 1366 pixels, the
maximum of the test machine, to accommodate the responsive design (automatic width
resizing according to the browser window) of most webpages, as shown in Table 3.1.
Based on the data collected over the last seven years, an empirical study is con-
ducted in this chapter. In this study, the ad density is found to have a positive relation
with the competition, but a negative relation with the unit payoff. By analysing time
series of ad density and daily page-views (PVs) over recent years, it is shown that the
ad density has been generally increasing, however the speed of increment is affected by
the change rate of PVs. It is worth pointing out that the empirical study is user-interest-
centric instead of content-centric. That is, websites are aggregated based on users’
interest segments (tags); then these tags are taken as keys in analysis. This conforms
with the modern RTB practice where segments are considered determinative [90].
Mathematically, ﬁnding an optimal ad density is a non-trivial task. The game the-
oretical model proposed in the chapter shows that it could be affected by many factors:
the unit payoff of displaying ads, the maintenance cost, daily PVs and natural growth,
users’ preference, ad density decisions of other similar thus competing publishers, etc.
The last factor is mostly overlooked in practice or existing research literature [91].
The unit payoff of display ads usually uses the CPM model [92]. There are other
pricing models available, for example, CPC and Cost Per Acquisition (CPA) [54].
However, CPM is mostly adopted and becoming the de facto standard in the popu-
lar Real-Time Bidding. CPM is used throughout the chapter to remove the challenge
of click through rate or conversion rate prediction.
In general, the ad density optimisation could be modelled as a control problem and
solved by applying the Pontryagin’s maximum principle [34]. The number of impres-
sions is considered the states and the ad density the control. Special attention is paid to
multiple publishers’ case where they provide similar content (stock prices, news, etc.)
and compete for users, who is assumed to visit one but only one of websites to ﬁnd
information on a regular basis. However, the user can also choose to leave all of these3.1. Related Works 35
Figure 3.1: The ad density refers to the percentage of ads of a website. The ﬁgure shows
the rapid increase of ad density (from less than 1.0% to around 18.0% in 3 years,
measured by image’s pixels) for a top-ranking website.
websites if there are too many ads [93]. It is assumed further that users’ decision on
which website to visit depends on the ad density only. This deﬁnes the state transition
function of the system.
Bycomparingcaseswithorwithoutcompetition, theanalysisshowsthatthesocial
welfare would be harmed if there are multiple publishers. Given the exact same param-
eter setting, the competing-case always ends up with fewer impressions and higher ad
density. Thus, it is globally sub-optimal when each publisher optimises towards one’s
self-interest. This result corresponds to a well-known economics phenomenon: the
tragedy of the commons [32] by considering users to be common resources. This calls
for more sensible control of ad density that could return a healthier online advertising
environment in the long term.
3.1 Related Works
The ad density problem is probably the ﬁrst question for publishers who want to run
an ad-supported website. In [91] the ad density problem has been studied for the ﬁrst
time in displaying advertising. The authors use a similar model as the thesis to capture3.1. Related Works 36
the relationship of revenue, trafﬁc, and users’ preferences. Then the authors evaluated
the market capitalisation of websites from a ﬁnance perspective. No competition has
been considered in the paper. Another piece of relevant work is [94] where a user-
centric approach has been adopted to study the display ads, although little attention has
been paid to the evolvement of ads over years. The importance of optimising a whole
webpage instead of placements is addressed in [95].
In [96] the authors analyse trafﬁc and revenue for big portal websites and conclude
that website attract more viewers would generate more revenue, which in turn enables
them to create more contents and attract even more visitors. This empirical result vali-
dates the proposed model where the websites’ competition is explicitly considered.
Similar to ﬁnding a balance between content and ads, in [97, 98] the authors study
the optimal combination of subscription fees and online advertising revenue. The con-
trol theory is used to optimise the subscription fee and advertising level dynamically at
the same time. The model suggests to reduce subscription fees and use a low ad density
in the beginning. A related work is [99] where the authors develop an economic model
to examine the proﬁtability of ﬂat-fee banner ads and contextual advertising in both a
monopolistic market and duopolistic market. Besides, the authors look at the market
efﬁciency (social welfare) the suggests a monopoly is more efﬁcient when the CTR of
ﬂat-fee banner ads is low. In [100] a similar analysis is performed to ﬁnd the optimal
strategy of selling software (ﬂat subscription fee or advertising-supported). In [101] the
authorsstudytheoptimalbiaslevelforsingleandmultiplegatekeepers(searchengines)
when they are identical or different. These concerns over competition in the market-
place inspire the development of this chapter. The optimal ad density problem has also
raisedattentioninthesponsoredsearchﬁeld. Thesestudiesmainlyfocusonﬁghtingfor
users’ attentions over organic search results and sponsored ads [102, 103, 104, 105, 5].
For example, in [5] the bidding strategy of an advertiser is studied when he needs to
compete against the organic search results as well as sponsored ads from competitors.
In [103] a bandit model is used to generate the most relevant information to be pre-
sented to limited attention users, rather than to show ads which causes distraction. The
work of [102] studies how users interact with search result pages using eye-tracking
techniques. Similarly, another eye-tracking based study is reported in [105] which con-
cludes that the amount of visual attention that people devote to ads depends on their3.2. An Empirical Study on Ad Density 37
Figure 3.2: An overview of datasets and their relationships used in the empirical study on ad
density. Numbers in parentheses are record counts.
quality, but not the type of task (informational or navigational).
3.2 An Empirical Study on Ad Density
This section presents an empirical study on display ad density evolution over recent
years. The analysis on evolution helps to understand the online advertising business,
provides insights into the whole ecosystem, especially from the users’ perspective, and
unveils important factors that affect the ad density decision. This section ﬁrstly de-
scribes the methodology of crawling data from various sources and then report ﬁndings
by linking datasets together.
3.2.1 Datasets and Procedures
The empirical study consists of many datasets. An overview of datasets is given in
Figure 3.2. As the start, 11k domains were selected from the top million1. These
domains were selected because their daily impressions (page-views, PVs) and users’
interest segments are available, too. Depending on when the publisher implemented
the trafﬁc analytic service, the reported daily PVs varies. The histogram of reported
lifetime is illustrated in Figure 3.3. A long reported lifetime is essential since later the
time series of daily PVs and ad density will be investigated. At last, 1149 domains that
have reported more than seven years’ daily PVs data were chosen for further analysis.
It is worth pointing out that impressions do not always equal to PVs, especially
when bid requests from each ad slot are sent separately. However, this number is almost
1www.quantcast.com/top-sites3.2. An Empirical Study on Ad Density 38
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Reported lifetime in days
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
Figure 3.3: Thetimespanofdailyimpressions(pageviews)fordomains. Manydomainsreport
daily trafﬁc for as long as 7 years. They were selected for further analysis.
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Figure 3.4: The second level tags’ average weights (how users are addicted) and frequencies
for selected domains. Both head and tail tags w.r.t. weight or frequency are anno-
tated. A higher weight indicates that visitors are easier to target because they use
the website a lot; a higher frequency means a lot of similar websites, thus, more
competition on the marketplace. Fantasy sports players show exceptional high in-
terest and loyalty which make the tag become almost an outlier.
impossible to calibrate. In this study, PVs are still considered to be reﬂecting the users’
preference and determining the income of an ad-supported website.
Then for each domain the audience proﬁle was obtained. These proﬁles are cre-3.2. An Empirical Study on Ad Density 39
Table 3.1: Statistics for selected ﬁrst level tags in 2014. Data includes width & height of web-
page documents, number of ads slots and average ads densities. The last column,
average competition, is computed by counting the number of domains sharing the
same tag then normalised by dividing by the maximum. Note that the document
width is largely a result of responsive design (automatic width resizing according to
the browser window) and the 1366 pixels width of the headless browser.
1st level tag
Doc.
Width (px)
Doc.
Height (px)
URLs
Ad
slots (k)
Avg. Ad
area (k pxˆ2)
Avg. Ad
density (%)
Avg.
competition
commerce 1357.8 60.6 3612.9 6462.7 48584 496.0 455.5 9.3 0.28
ﬁnance 1364.1 18.0 3422.3 6160.7 8254 76.7 218.1 4.7 0.18
family 1355.2 58.0 3933.7 8170.3 73143 472.9 668.3 12.5 0.60
entertainment 1359.2 46.1 4316.4 8848.9 56129 550.3 534.4 9.1 0.44
career 1362.1 21.9 2833.9 2848.1 5661 56.3 270.3 7.0 0.46
auto 1361.4 42.1 3605.9 6535.1 25791 267.3 377.4 7.7 0.51
news 1358.4 47.3 4055.3 7121.1 40499 421.7 469.8 8.5 0.48
education 1355.8 56.9 4557.9 9987.8 52210 508.1 549.1 8.9 1.00
ated by a commercial Data Management Platform (DMP) based on billions of online
tracking records. Instead of classifying domains based on their content, domains were
tagged with users’ interest segments (a.k.a., audience proﬁles, or tags). This approach
is getting more popular in recent years, especially with the emergence of RTB and
DMPs. It is fair to consider this approach beneﬁcial in the study as more ads are dis-
played based on users’ interest, too. By linking them together directly instead of using
the website content as a proxy, users’ preference could be reﬂected more closely. Pro-
vided by the same DMP, there are ten ﬁrst level tags and 101 second level tags in total
in the dataset. The frequency and average weight of tags (i.e., what is users’ afﬁnity
with the website) are plotted in Figure 3.4. Interestingly, fantasy sports players show
exceptional loyalty that makes the tag become almost an outlier.
For each domain in the dataset, the Wayback Machine [106] of the Internet
Archive project was queried for archival webpages. Each domain was also accessed di-
rectly for the current snapshot. Taking those as seeds, out-links under the same domain
were crawled with a depth of 3. This built the websites’ archive & current snapshot
dataset. The number of archives for domains are increasing over years, as shown in
Figure 3.5. Although the earliest archives were from 1996, only the archival webpages
from 2008 were analysed and plotted when the daily PVs data also became available.
Lastly, each archival and current webpages were analysed for ad slots. Every3.2. An Empirical Study on Ad Density 40
Table 3.2: Daily PVs and effective-CPM estimation for the selected ﬁrst level tags from Google
AdWords in 2014. The ﬁgures were acquired by submitting keywords to the trafﬁc
estimation tool.
1st level tags 2nd level tags (examples) eCPM ($) Daily PV (m)
commerce commerce/movies, commerce/music, consumer electronics, consumer goods 0.578 0.816
ﬁnance banking, online trading, insurance, taxes 1.597 1.033
family family, baby, bridal, kids, kids education, parenting 0.970 0.609
entertainment books, magazines, movies, music/radio, gaming information 1.319 3.703
career career resources, job search 0.987 0.228
auto auto listings, auto manufacturers, auto news & info, auto resources, car rental 0.741 0.307
news news/information, business news & info, weather 0.428 1.567
education educational resources, schools/universities, technology 0.881 0.038
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Figure 3.5: The number of archives for tags over years. Only the archival webpages from 2008
were analysed and plotted when the daily PVs data also became available. In fact,
the dataset contain archives from 1996. Note that since the analysis was performed
in the early 2014, the archives for this year is yet not complete. This would be
compensated by the analysis on current URLs.
webpage was loaded in a headless browser (without the graphical interface), waited
until fully rendered, then parsed for ad slots based on various rules. Commonly known
advertising domains [107], typical ad unit sizes [9], and AdBlock Plus subscription
lists [108] were used to identify ad slots. When an ad slot was found, a piece of
JavaScript code would be injected to obtain the size and position of the slot. The size of
the whole webpage was also saved. If a webpage failed to render, it would be excluded
from all datasets.
Note that there are some limitation of the crawling and analysing procedure:
• For some domains, the archive may not be available (but at the tag level there are
always thousands of archives);
• Some historical web servers may not be available, resulting in incompletely ren-3.2. An Empirical Study on Ad Density 41
dering of webpages;
• Some historical ad servers may not be available, resulting in incompletely ren-
dering of ads;
• Some uncommon ad slots could not be identiﬁed.
However, since the empirical study focuses on the trends instead of accurate ad density,
these limitations do not harm the validity of the study because they always exist.
When a webpage cannot be correctly rendered it usually gives a bigger ad density,
especially with the lack of CSS ﬁles which control the layout of elements and make
the parallel positioning possible; when ad cannot be rendered, or ad slots cannot be
identiﬁed, they give a smaller ad density. In order to minimise the impact, as many data
points were collected and the URL was redirected to the current URL if the archival
one was not available or not included due to robots.txt settings.
3.2.2 Results
The analysis has two parts. First the current status of display ads across user’ interest
segments (tags) is studied; then the ad density evolution over past years is reported and
compared with historical daily PVs. Since the current snapshot does not rely on the
Internet Archive service or obsolete ad servers, the ﬁgure would be more accurate.
3.2.2.1 Statistics of the Current Snapshot
The main result is summarised in Table 3.1. It is not surprising to see webpages report
a stable width but a considerably varying height. Websites with different tags contain
very different number of URLs (thus ad slots) due to their nature of business. For
example, ﬁnance and career are meant to offer services and very speciﬁc information;
while entertainment and news are designed to provide as many articles as possible.
Besides, comparing with Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4 shows that the unit payoff and
competition heavily affect the ad density decision. For example, ﬁnance reports ad
density  = 4:7% because its big unit payoff c = $1:597, average daily impressions
 x = 1:033 million and low market competition; on the contrary, family reports a much
larger average ad density because its smaller c = $0:970,  x = 0:609 million, and higher
competition level. This leads to an important ﬁnding of the relationship of ad density,
competition, and unit payoff, as shown in Figure 3.6. The competition is deﬁned as the
number of websites sharing the same tag. The effective Cost Per Mille (eCPM) data is3.2. An Empirical Study on Ad Density 42
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Figure 3.6: The relationship of competition, unit payoff and ad density plotted against all 2nd
level tags. The competition is deﬁned as the number of websites sharing the same
tag (then normalised). The effective-cost-per-mille (eCPM) data is acquired from
Google AdWords. The ﬁtted lines suggest that higher competition leads to higher
ad density, while higher eCPM leads to lower ad density.
acquired from Google AdWords by submitting keywords to the trafﬁc estimation tool.
The ﬁtted lines suggest that higher competition leads to higher ad density while higher
eCPM leads to lower ad density. This serves as part of the foundation of the proposed
model in the later part of the paper.
Another interesting observation is on the popularity of ad slot sizes. There exists
guidelines for ad slots and creative design[9]; however, there are also large number of
ad slots that do not conform these guidelines, as shown in Figure 3.7. It is commonly
known that ads of different size will deliver varying impact on campaigns’ effective-
ness, as well as users’ satisfactory. However, this factor is not included in the proposed
model. Interested readers may refer to [94].
3.2.2.2 Ad density evolution
The evolution of ad density grouped by tags is plotted in Figure 3.8. Six tags are
presented because of their representative trends.
First of all, a general declining trend of desktop PVs is found for most tags. This
is consistent with the recent industrial ﬁndings [109]. It is especially true for news
and education. This is mainly because of the rapid expansion of hand-held devices
like smart mobile phones and tablets which take over the online trafﬁc. People use
desktops and laptops less because hand-held devices are more convenient and equally
powerful in many cases. This has resulted in a trafﬁc shifting from the desktop to3.2. An Empirical Study on Ad Density 43
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Figure 3.7: The distribution of top ad slot sizes in 2014.
the mobile environment. In this thesis, the desktop environment is still the focus as
it is much more mature and richer in historical archives. However, it is believed that
display ads (on both mobile websites and apps) are far from saturated in the mobile
environment [110] that could make an interesting topic for the future works.
Secondly, despite that trafﬁc is declining, the ad density for most categories is
increasing, except for ﬁnance which shows a decreasing trend; and news which exhibits
an almost ﬂat line. Among them, the fastest growing category is family which gives a
17.65% annual change on average. If only considering ﬁrst screens the ﬁgure becomes
27.58%.
Thirdly, ad density time series have good correlation with percentage changes of
page-views, as shown below the time series plot of each ﬁrst level tag. The correla-
tion usually achieves the maximum with 1-2 time period lag, indicating the ad density
usually changes after 1-2 years of observation of website trafﬁc. By comparing the cor-
relation of the percentage changes, it is not hard to see that page-views heavily affect
the ad density decision. Although the website trafﬁc is generally declining and the ad
density is increasing, a fast PVs declining speed will slow down the increment of ads,
e.g., education. This ﬁnding makes an important aspect of the proposed model.
Fourthly, most websites choose to have a slightly higher ﬁrst screen ad density
comparing with the whole webpage. The ﬁrst screen is part of a webpage that is dis-
played (without scrolling) in the view-port of the browser after the webpage is loaded
and rendered completely. It is seen by visitors by default, thus attracts most attention3.2. An Empirical Study on Ad Density 44
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Figure 3.8: The evolution of monthly PVs v.s. ad density in recent years and correlation of
their percentage change. Ad slots with lower border’s vertical position within 1000
pixels from the top of a webpage are considered to be on the ﬁrst screen. Six
tags are selected and presented here to show different trends. Note that the PVs are
declining for many tags. This is consistent with the recent industrial ﬁndings [109].
PVs and ad density usually have good correlation with some lags.
and usually considered premium inventory that generates a large proportion of revenue.
In this empirical study, the ﬁrst screen is deﬁned to have a length of 1000 pixels. That
is, if the vertical position of lower border of an ad is less than 1000 pixels from the top
of the webpage, it is considered on the ﬁrst screen.
Plots in Figure 3.8 show that most websites choose to use a higher ad density
on the ﬁrst screen. This is especially true for commerce, entertainment, news, and3.3. Ad Density Modelling 45
education categories. ﬁnance unveils something interesting: although the overall ad
density has been decreasing from 2013, the ﬁrst screen one is not. This means the
ﬁrst screen ads are considered to be more important by publishers, thus may require
separate consideration.
Lastly, there is a noticeable discrepancy when comparing ad density from histori-
cal archives of 2014 and the current snapshot (Table 3.1). As argued before, this is due
to practical constraints on webpage crawling and ad slot identiﬁcation. The ad density
ofhistoricalarchivestendstobesmaller, whichimpliesthatadtagsexpiremorequickly
than webpage content. Besides, when CSS or JavaScript ﬁles are masked by robots.txt
the webpage content tends to occupy more space because of the loss of position and
size conﬁguration. However, these constraints exist for all archives. The overall trend
is still valid and valuable.
To sum up, this empirical study exposes important trends of ad density evolution
and its relationship with unit payoff and daily trafﬁc. These directly support the pro-
posed model in the next section.
3.3 Ad Density Modelling
This section discusses the ad density modelling. It is preferable to design a model
that includes major factors and reﬂects ﬁndings from the empirical study. Consider a
common case as the start: suppose there are two symmetric publishers i and j who
run websites and subsidise the running cost by revenue from display advertising. Here
the term symmetric means both publishers provide almost the same content or services
(e.g., news, stock prices, etc.) therefore they compete for the same group of Internet
users. These users have to fulﬁl their informational need by visiting either one of the
websites, but not necessarily both of them. However, these users are advertising aver-
sion that means they would prefer a website with fewer ads. To simplify the problem it
is assumed that the movement of users is solely affected by advertising (i.e., more ads
drive away users more quickly). Also note that this setup could be quickly expanded to
cases with more competing publishers.
Take publisher i for example. At each time step t within the discrete planning
horizon 0  t  T, the publisher decides the ad density i of his website. Let the
state variable xi(t) denote the number of impressions. The goal is to ﬁnd a strategy3.3. Ad Density Modelling 46
() : t ! (t) that maximises the cumulative payoff, which is deﬁned as:
R(i;xi) =
T X
t
 
cii(t)xi(t)  
ki (1   i(t))
2
2
!
(3.1)
where ci accounts for the unit payoff and ki for the running cost. Note that a ﬁnite
planning horizon T is used for the ease of derivation. By using a big enough T the
model could approximate the case of inﬁnite planning horizon, which usually include a
discount factor for future payoff as shown in Figure 3.11. Moreover, for the simplicity
the terminal payoff of the planning horizon is assumed to be zero.
The individual state transition function for each publisher is inspired by the
Lanchester’s Laws [111]. They are mathematical formulae for calculating the relative
strengths of a predator/prey pair. The Lanchester equations are differential equations
describing the time dependence of two armies’ strengths A and B as a function of
time, with the function depending only on A and B. For example, suppose A and B are
shooting a continuous stream of bullets at each other. Then the Lanchester’s Square
Law models the loss of soldiers as
dA
dt
=  B (3.2)
dB
dt
=  A (3.3)
where  and  are the offensive ﬁre-power for A and B respectively.
Similarly, the ad density model considers the opposite decision as the ﬁre-power
of attracting visitors. Since these two publishers are competing with each other the
state transition function (for publisher i) is deﬁned as:
xi(t) = nj(t)xj(t)   mi(t)xi(t) + hi (3.4)
where parameters m and n models users’ preferences: 0  m  1 controls the rate
that users leaving a website because of too many ads and 0  n  m controls the rate
that users turn to the competitor’s website.; hi is the natural growth. The objective and
transition functions for publisher j are similar.
This is a typical example of differential games. In this game, every publisher3.4. Solutions and Discussions 47
tries to maximise his own payoff deﬁned by Equation 3.1 while taking into account the
interaction with competitors deﬁned by Equation 3.4, subject to the obvious constraint:
0  i;j  1 (3.5)
The objective, transition functions, and constraint together from both publishers
form a system to optimise. Note that there are only two publishers in the model but it
could be extended to cases of more publishers easily.
3.4 Solutions and Discussions
A Nash equilibrium solution to the above differential game can be found as follows.
Firstly, the Hamiltonians are formed by introducing adjoint variables i and j; then,
two groups of partial differential equations (PDEs) could be found. For example, for
publisher i the Hamiltonian is:
H
 
xi(t);i(t);i(t)

(3.6)
= cii(t)xi(t)  
ki (1   i(t))
2
2
+ i(t)
 
nj(t)xj(t)   mi(t)xi(t) + hi

where xj(t) is treated as a known parameter. From the Hamiltonian the PDEs are
obtained:
@H
@i(t)
= 0 (3.7)
= cixi(t) + ki
 
1   i(t)

  xi(t)mi(t)
@H
@xi(t)
=  i(t) (3.8)
= cii(t)   mi(t)i(t)
Suppose both i and j satisfy the condition that make the optimal ad densities
non-zero. Then the adjoint variables are obtained by solving a boundary value problem3.4. Solutions and Discussions 48
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Figure 3.9: When the two publishers have different CPM c the optimal controls become differ-
ent. The solid lines are for publisher-i and dashed lines are for publisher-j who has
a ﬁxed c2 = 2000. However, this is not validated in the empirical study due to no
access to the unit payoff for each website. Note the last step always gives  = 1
due to the zero terminal value thus omitted in all plots.
with the terminal conditions:
i(T) = 0 (3.9)
j(T) = 0 (3.10)
Then the optimal controls are obtained by solving the following equations:
1(t) (3.11)
=
 1(t + 1)   2(t)n2(t)
c1   1(t)m
2(t) (3.12)
=
c12(t + 1)   1(t)
 
n1(t + 1) + m2(t + 1)

c1c2 + m
 
c12(t)   c21(t)

  1(t)2(t)
 
n2   m2
Finally, the state variables are obtained by substituting i and j into Equation 3.4
with the initial conditions:
x1(0) = x
0
1 (3.13)
x2(0) = x
0
2 (3.14)
It is expected that if two publishers have different parameters the optimal controls3.4. Solutions and Discussions 49
become different, although this is not validated in the empirical study since there was
no access to the unit payoff for each website. For example, when publisher-j has
higher CPM c1, he could display fewer ads to build a greater user base, resulting in a
higher return in the longer term while having the same payoff in the short term. This is
illustrated in Figure 3.9. On the contrary, when publisher-i has a lower unit payoff c1
he has to display more ads to cover the maintenance cost.
3.4.1 Social Welfare Maximisation
This section discusses variations of the proposed model. The comparison of these vari-
ations leads to the discussion of social welfare maximisation and tragedy of the com-
monsphenomenon. Thesediscussionscanmapbacktoreal-worldcasesreportedbythe
empirical study thus are helpful for understanding the display advertising ecosystem in
the long term.
Firstly, let us simplify the system by removing competition. When there is only
a single (dominant) publisher on the marketplace, the solution looks different. In this
case, the individual optimum achieved by the publisher is indeed the global optimum.
In the real-world and in some countries, the Google search engine (67.6% in US in
2014 [112] and Facebook (71.0% in US in 2013 [113]) serve good examples to this
scenario, although not perfect. The following discusses both cases that a publisher use
a dynamic ad density or has to stick to a static one.
3.4.1.1 Dynamic Ad Density
The publisher is still expected to decide a dynamic ad density. Then, the problem
becomes a standard optimal control problem with a single state variable and a control
variable. Here the state transition function is:
x(t) =  m(t)x(t) + h (3.15)
The users from other websites have been removed due to no competition. But users are
still free to leave if getting annoyed.
The objective function remains the same:
R(;x) =
T X
t

c(t)x(t)   k
(1   (t))2
2

(3.16)3.4. Solutions and Discussions 50
where the terminal value is still assumed to be zero.
To solve this problem, the Hamiltonian can be constructed by introducing an ad-
joint variable :
H(x(t);(t);(t)) = c(t)x(t)   k
(1   (t))2
2
(3.17)
+ (t)
 
  m(t)x(t) + h

Similarly, the partial differential equations are obtained by examining the Hamil-
tonian:
@H
@x
= c(t)   m(t)(t) = (t)   (t + 1) (3.18)
and applying the Pontryagin’s maximum principle:
@H
@
= cx(t) + k
 
1   (t)

  mx(t)(t) = 0 (3.19)
Finally, the iterative solutions could be obtained by solving the boundary value
problem with the initial and terminal conditions:
x(0) = x
0 (3.20)
(T) = 0 (3.21)
Here, let us brieﬂy examine parameters of the simpliﬁed model. Parameter c is the
unit payoff (usually CPM) for impressions. The empirical study suggests that it has a
negative relationship with ad density: when c is small, the publisher has to use a higher
ad density to compensate the running cost; on the contrary, good proﬁt from ads allows
the publisher to use a lower ad density to build a greater user base, which is beneﬁcial
for the long term. This relationship is conﬁrmed in Figure 3.10 (a).
Although not presented in the empirical study due to difﬁculty in accessing data,
it is not hard to imagine that running cost factor k also affects the payoff and ad density
decision. A high running cost factor would reduce the payoff and force the publisher
to use a higher ad density; on the contrary, a small k allows the publisher to employ a
small ad density while giving higher long term payoff. This relationship is illustrated3.4. Solutions and Discussions 51
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Figure 3.10: Parameters affect the planning. The unit payoff factor c and user attrition factor m
have negative relationship with ad density; the running cost factor k has positive
relationship with ad density.
in Figure 3.10 (b).
It is worth pointing out that both parameters c and k are easy to measure and
straightforward to understand. In order to optimise the cumulative revenue over the3.4. Solutions and Discussions 52
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Figure 3.11: Parameter T affects the planning. Using a large T allows publishers to approxi-
mate the inﬁnite planning horizon.
planning horizon, the publisher should try to ﬁnd ad channels that give high re-
turn [114], and reduce the running cost, too. Note that here c is assumed to be a known
constant, while it is usually an unknown random variable in practice. In such cases,
learning based techniques could be used to ﬁnd c. Besides, deviation or conﬁdence
intervals of the estimation could be used as the risk of the planning [115]. These are
not discussed in the thesis but left to the future works.
Another important factor of the model is m which reﬂects the users’ attitude over
receiving ads. In this thesis, it is called the user attrition factor. A high m means
more impressions would get lost for the next time step (more users leaving) due to
displaying ads. In such case, a conservative approach is naturally required as illustrated
in Figure 3.10 (c).
At last let us examine the parameter T. Not surprisingly the T would affect cu-
mulatively payoff and average impressions. However, it is worth noting that T does
not change the ﬁnal ad density given other factors remaining the same as shown in
Figure 3.11. This ﬁnding conﬁrms that the proposed model is practical in real-world
applications: a publisher could start with a big T and re-evaluate parameters in later
stages. This is, in fact, a standard practice given the rapid development of display
advertising ecosystem.
3.4.1.2 Tragedy of the Commons
The term tragedy of the commons refers to the case that individuals act independently
and rationally to maximise one’s own interest, however these actions are contrary to the3.4. Solutions and Discussions 53
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Figure 3.12: Comparing ad density decisions, cumulative payoff, and public resources (im-
pressions) for cases with or without competition. The case with competition leads
to tragedy of the commons while the no-competition case represents the social
welfare maximisation. For the former one, the ad density (solid lines) is higher
while the impressions (dashed lines) are lower than the global optimal which is
obtained from a single publisher case. As a result, users are less satisﬁed, and the
cumulative payoff is smaller.
whole group’s long-term best interest by depleting some common resource. In online
advertising case, competing publishers want to maximise one’s cumulative payoff. Al-
though each publisher’s decision is optimal within the planning horizon, the decisions
as a whole are sub-optimal to the group. The common resource being depleted here
is impressions (users): website visitors get less satisﬁed because of being shown more
ads; at last, they choose to leave both websites.
It has been shown in the empirical study that competition has a positive relation-
ship with ad density. This assumption is not difﬁcult to validate by comparing two
cases. The ad density, impressions, and cumulative payoff for both models are plotted
in Figure 3.12 and consider the single publisher case to be global optimal. The follow-
ing parameters are used for the MAXWELFARE model: x0 = 10000;h = 5000;m =3.4. Solutions and Discussions 54
0:2;c = 2000;k = 100
For the TRAGEDYCOMM model it is assumed that there are two competing pub-
lishers and simply split the initial user base and natural growth, and take into account
the users’ transition: c1 = c2 = 2000;k1 = k2 = 100;x0
1 = x0
2 = 5000;h1 = h2 =
2500;m = 0:4;n = 0:2
Note that impressions and cumulative payoff are aggregated for the MAXWEL-
FARE case. Both publishers follow the same ad density curve since they are symmetric.
The plot shows that the TRAGEDYCOMM case builds a smaller user base and receives
less cumulative payoff almost at every time step. It indicates that ads are overcrowded
and users’ attention has been overgrazed, thus, users are less satisﬁed. This could harm
the online advertising ecosystem in the long term. It is necessary to develop counter-
measures to promote more sensible ad density [32].
3.4.1.3 Static Ad Density
Lastly, the model is simpliﬁed further by assuming that a static ad density is used
throughout the planning horizon. In fact, this is never a rare case in real-world since
changing templates is costly for most websites. Thus, publishers have to do the change
infrequently and rely on static ad densities between changes.
The solution to this variation is obtained by inspecting the ﬁrst order derivative
of the payoff function. Firstly, let us review the payoff and transition function for this
case:
R(;x) =
T X
t

cx(t)   k
(1   )2
2

(3.22)
x(t) =  mx(t) + h (3.23)
the latter yields:
x(t) = (1   m)
tx
0 +
1   (1   m)t
m
h (3.24)
Again, the goal of the publisher is to maximise the total payoff R within the planning
horizon 1  t  T.
The optimal  could be found by taking the derivative of R and letting it equals to3.5. Conclusion 55
zero:
dR
d
= 0 (3.25)
which gives:
 
 Tkm + 2ch + 2cx0
6cmx0 (3.26)
+
q
Tkm
 
TKm + 4c(3mx0   h   x0)

+
 
2c(h + x0)
2
6cmx0
by assuming (1 m)T  0. The optimality could be proved by examining the second
order derivative which is omitted here.
3.5 Conclusion
The ad density problem has been studied in this chapter from both empirical and theo-
retical perspectives. Results from a large-scale real-world dataset are presented which
unveils the general growing trend of online display ads in recent years. Besides, im-
portant ﬁndings are reported including: higher unit payoff leads to a lower ad density
but higher competition lead to a higher one; ad density has been gradually increasing
over years and the incremental speed is affected by the change rate of trafﬁc. Based
on these ﬁndings, the ad density model is formulated and solutions are provided for
different cases using control theory and game theory. The model and solution map to
the results of empirical study well. Speciﬁcally, the maximisation of social welfare
and tragedy of the commons phenomenon is discussed. It shows that online display
ads are overcrowded and users’ attention has been overgrazed. Due to the complexity
of real-world business the model is not perfect (e.g., some publishers mainly rely on
subscription fees thus have few ads). It could also be improved by making unit payoff
and cost parameters stochastic. These are left to the future works.Chapter 4
Sequential Ads Selection
Given an ad density, a publisher can estimate the number of impressions based on the
historical website trafﬁc. However, as illustrated in
Besides an ad density and the expected number of impressions, a publisher has
more control over payoff maximisation over time by selecting ad sources. In practice,
it can be challenging because of abundant options great volatility of payoff.
First, one has to decide whether to make contracts with advertisers or agencies
directlyortoregister withpublicadnetworksorexchanges toreachmoredemands. For
example, in [40] a queuing system is proposed to ﬁnd the optimal policy of selecting
advertisers to make private contracts, whereas in [16, 99], the focus is on pricing ads
properly in either of the two settings.
Second, the payment scheme could be different, and the publisher needs to choose
from CPM, CPC, and possibly other models, c.f. deﬁnitions in Appendix A. To achieve
the maximum revenue, a balance of such choices can be established in a static setting
as reported in [44, 43, 45].
Lastly and most importantly, the publisher has to decide on which page [24, 116]
and which users [117, 118] these ads should be matched with, probably in a real-time
fashion using text summaries [21]. These are also known as contextual and behaviour
targeting. Traditionally the matching is done by ad networks and advertisers are al-
lowed to choose which keywords they intend to bid. Now publishers are getting more
involved and can actively switch in nearly real-time between different pricing schemes
and different sources in order to increase their ad payoffs as demonstrated in the Google
Double Click For Publisher [119] and some ad exchanges like AppNexus [120].
The nearly real-time switching ability essentially allows online publishers to inte-4.1. Related Works 57
grate the above decisions all together in a more general framework to optimise their ad
revenue. However, the following challenges remain unsolved because of its dynamic
settings: First, the prior analysis of the matching between content and ads provides a
ﬁne start but a perfect match does not guarantee the maximum revenue. With the lim-
ited display impressions, publishers also need to balance the need of selecting ads and
their pricing schemes to learn the true payoffs (exploration) with that of allocating ads
to generate high immediate payoffs based on the current belief (exploitation). Second,
online publishers have more opportunities to explore from different ad networks and
pricing schemes provided ads are correlated. The key question is how to make use of
the correlations embedded in the data to improve the efﬁciency of the exploration and
increase the ad incomes in the long term.
This chapter studies the above two issues and formulate the sequential ad selection
problem by applying Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs). To
provide a basic understanding of publisher revenue problem when dealing with mul-
tiple ad sources, various trade mechanisms and pricing models are not distinguished.
They are simply expected to contribute revenue once selected. Moreover, to make the
research focused, the problem is formulated by considering the correlation of ads only
while the same principle and result can be applied to the correlation of webpages and
users. The mathematical derivation shows that the expected payoff and variance of cor-
related ads can be naturally updated using a formula similar to collaborative ﬁltering
(i.e., to learn the preference from the similar users). Then the model is examined on a
carefully collected dataset, and the results show that the proposed models, particularly
with the new belief updates, outperform other strong baselines.
4.1 Related Works
This section discusses the related works to the ad selection and keyword extraction
problems which are studied in this chapter.
4.1.1 Ad Selection
Traditionally, the research question is limited to how to choose advertisers to make (pri-
vate) contracts with, as elaborated in [121, 40, 14]. In [40] the authors use a queueing
system to accommodate advertisers and add constraint that advertisers are impatient4.1. Related Works 58
and would leave if their ads cannot be displayed right way. A dynamic programming
solution is provided in [14] by combining the available ad inventories and dynamically
delivery of promised advertising contract to the viewers. This inspires the development
of this chapter.
In terms of techniques, this chapter is closely related to multi-arm bandit with
dependent arms discussed in [122]. Because it also dels with a multi-period selec-
tion problem with exploration and exploitation dilemma. In [122] the dependencies of
candidates are modelled by clustering them ﬁrst; after that, a multi-arm bandit algo-
rithm runs twice: ﬁrst selects a cluster and then a candidate in that cluster. Our paper
is different in that the dependency is directly modelled using a covariance matrix. The
impact of correlation is well formulated and illustrated by rigorously deriving the belief
updates once other correlated ads have been selected. Speciﬁcally, the problem is for-
mulated by applying Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) with
discrete action (selection of ads), continuous observations (payoffs), and continuous
hidden states (performance of ads). The proposed model is a special case of continuous
POMDPs [123, 124], where two-stage Gaussian generative processes and no transit
of hidden states are considered during the planning horizon. To provide an optimal
ad selection, similar with [124, 125], the Monte Carlo sampling is used to deal with
continuous observations and to approximate a Dynamic Programming solution in the
ﬁnite planning horizon. As a complement of the approximation approach, the Upper
Conﬁdence Bound algorithm [126] is extended by integrating with the belief update.
4.1.2 Keyword Extraction
In the later part of this chapter an adaptive keyword extraction tool is presented. It is
especially useful when an ad source allows (or expects) an input of keywords. There
are commercial tools generating high co-occurrence or similar phrases as suggestions
based on seed terms provided by user, like Google AdWords Keyword Tool1. There are
two problems for these tools: 1) it still requires fair amount of manual work to input
seeds and choose from suggestions; 2) the topics of generated phrases are based on
user query logs, existing bid phrases, and lexical analysis, and may easily drift from
the original from webpages.
1http://adwords.google.com/select/KeywordToolExternal4.1. Related Works 59
Keyword extraction is typically considered a supervised learning problem [127,
128, 129, 130] where the algorithms learn to classify as positive or negative examples
of keywords based on training sets. These algorithms need expensive human labelled
dataset in advance, and usually perform the learning process ofﬂine. The model could
become inaccurate when users’ interests change over time. In [128] linguistic knowl-
edge is introduced such as noun-phrase-chunks (NP-chunks) and part-of-speech (POS)
to outperform using statistics features only. These linguistic features are also used in
the proposed system. Besides, query logs have been used as a good reﬂect of users’
interests [131]. However, such logs are not available in this chapter.
There are also extensive research on keyword suggestion. In [132] the keywords
are suggested based on concept hierarchy mapping therefore the suggestions are not
limited to the bag-of-words of the webpage, and may expand to non-obvious ones
which are categorised in bigger concepts. The work of [133, 134] recognise that the
bid prices for hot keywords are high therefore would cost more, and try to ﬁnd related
non-obvious keywords that are cheaper. Although these keywords may have lower traf-
ﬁc, but when combined the trafﬁc could match that of a hot one, while these keywords
cost less in total.
In [20] the authors propose a classiﬁer that uses multiple text features, includ-
ing how often the term occurs in search query logs, to extract keywords for ad tar-
geting. The system discussed in [130] ﬁrst generates candidates by several methods
including a translation model capable of generating phrases not appearing in the text
of the pages. Then candidates are ranked in a probabilistic framework using both the
translation model favouring relevant phrases, as well as a language model favouring
well-formed phrases. Another relevant piece of work is [135]. The authors propose
an exploration-exploitation algorithm of sorting keywords in an descending order of
proﬁt-to-cost ratio and adaptively identify the set of keywords to bid on based on his-
torical performance with a daily budget constraint. The proposed system tries to ﬁnd
the keywords from the given webpage with additional web knowledge, rather than ﬁnd
proﬁtable ones from a very large set (like 50k). Then the matching of keywords and
ads is left to display ad networks/exchanges, such as Google AdSense.
In [136] the authors propose a combination algorithm of using Upper Conﬁdence
Bound (UCB) and -greedy to solve the exploration-exploitation dilemma. Their target4.2. The Sequential Payoff Model 60
is to select high proﬁt ads which would be fed in contextual advertising platforms. The
feature vectors of ads are not used in their system as side information, instead, they use
standard bandits considering that the reward follows an unknown stochastic process.
This partially inspires the development of this chapter.
4.2 The Sequential Payoff Model
This section formulates the sequential ad selection problem. Suppose there is an online
publisher who wants to put ads on their hosting webpages to generate proﬁts. The
ads could be obtained from various sources either by making contracts with advertisers
directly, by registering with ad networks or by employing a SSP [119]. Moreover, some
ad networks allows (or expects) an input of keywords to return relevant ads. To help to
address this challenge an adaptive keyword extraction system is proposed in the later
part of this chapter.
Suppose there are N ads from various ad networks or exchanges available for the
publisher. For each display impression, the publisher needs to decide which ad source
to select. Without loss of generality, let us consider making our selection decisions
every M impressions and denote the decision times as t 2 [1;:::;T]. To stay focused,
let us assume that impressions from the same webpage are independent while bearing
in mind that the scenario of multiple impressions can be addressed by incorporating
user click-through models to remove rank bias [76].
For each time step t 2 [1;:::;T], let us deﬁne
	(t) =
2
6 6 6 6
6 6 6
4
s(1); x(1)
:::; :::
s(t   1); x(t   1)
3
7 7 7 7
7 7 7
5
(4.1)
as the available information up to time t, where s(t) 2 N denotes the decision, i.e. the
index of ad selected for the time step t. The random variable X(t) is used to denote the
payoff gained at time step t and x(t) its realization.
Let  be an arbitrary choosing policy according to the information obtained so far.4.2. The Sequential Payoff Model 61
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Figure 4.1: The payoff model illustrated by an inﬂuence diagram representation with gener-
ative processes of a ﬁnite horizon POMDP. In this diagram, the non-ﬁlled circu-
lar nodes represent variables including belief states; the shaded nodes represent
rewards as well as observations of the system; the black point nodes represent
non-random values; the non-ﬁlled square rectangular nodes represent actions. The
dotted lines indicate indirect dependency and intermediate nodes are not drawn.
Note that s() also depends on 2
0 but lines are not drawn for simplicity.
Let us deﬁne
s(t)  (	(t)) (4.2)
To simplify the notation, policy  and decision s() are used interchangeably in the rest
of the chapter. The cumulative payoff over time T with certain policy  is
R(T)  M
T X
t=1
Xs(t)(t) (4.3)
The goal is to choose the optimal policy to maximise R(T). However, there is no
observation on any future xs(t)(t) (where t  t0) before making a decision about s(t)
(at t = t0). For a given webpage, let us assume two generative processes to generate
the payoffs as shown in Figure 4.1. First, the matching between ads and the webpage is
considered the true but unknown payoffs of ads over a webpage as , a N-dimension
vector. This vector is generated from a multivariate Gaussian distribution governed by
mean vector  and covariance matrix  as the following
  N(;) (4.4)
where  and  are the parameters of the model and can be estimated beforehand from
data. Meanwhile, considering the fact that the payoffs are affected by either the visiting4.2. The Sequential Payoff Model 62
users, some unexpected factors, or the uncertainty that has not been well modelled from
the Gaussian, the observed payoffs are generated from the true payoffs by
X  N(;
2
0  I) (4.5)
where X is a N-dimension observed payoff vector and I is the identity matrix. A
simple variance 2
0 is used to model the noise. A universal constant is used to describe
the possible noise, as the treatment of the uncertainty from the underlying users. The
experiments will show that the noise factor, although simple, plays an important role in
controlling the sensitivity of the proposed model. For more advanced treatment about
user modelling, interested readers may refer to [118]. Given the two-stage process (i.e.,
decide and update), the objective of the publisher is to ﬁnd the optimal policy which
maximises the expectation of the overall ad income through the period, i.e.,

 =argmax

E[R(T)]
=argmax

E
"
T X
t=1
Xs(t)(t)
#
=argmax

T X
t=1
E

Xs(t)(t)

=argmax

T X
t=1
Z
x
xs(t)(t)p(xs(t)(t)j	(t))dx
=argmax

T X
t=1
s(t)(t) (4.6)
where M is dropped from Equation 4.3 because the decision is independent of it. Note
that s(t)(t) is the shorthand for ^ s(t)j	(t), denoting the estimated expectation of s(t)
at time step t giving all available information 	(t). It presents publisher’s belief at time
t. The above formulation is, in fact, a special case of continuous POMDPs [123, 124],
where  is the hidden state, and X is the observation over time and the belief about 
would be sequentially updated using a posterior probability. The next task is to provide
the estimation s(t)(t) at each time step t after an ad has been selected, and its payoff
has been observed. The belief update for correlated ads is particularly interesting and
important, which will be discussed in the next section.4.2. The Sequential Payoff Model 63
4.2.1 Belief Updates
At each time step the publisher makes a decision, observes the payoff, and then updates
expected payoffs of all ads. In order to calculate the expected payoffs the publisher
needstocalculatethevalueof(t+1)and(t+1)accordingtoobservationxs(t)(t)and
the previous belief. This section derives the update equation using Bayesian inference.
Let us ﬁrst look at the brief update of the same ads. Suppose the publisher has two
ad sources. The ﬁrst was selected at time step t and received a payoff of x1(t). With
Bayes’ theorem and marginalizing 1 out, the p.d.f. of X1 conditioned on the new
observation x1(t) and previous available information 	(t) is obtained:
p(x1jx1(t);	(t))
=
Z
p(x1jx1(t);	(t);1)p(1jx1(t);	(t))d (4.7)
where
p
 
1jx1(t);	(t)

/ p(x1(t)j1;	(t))p(1j	(t))
/ exp
n
 
 
x1(t)   1
2  
 
1   1(t)
2o
(4.8)
and by inspecting the exponent part, ﬁnd the posterior distribution of 1 is found as
1jx1(t)  N
 
1(t + 1);
2
1(t + 1)

(4.9)
1(t + 1) =
2
1(t)x1(t) + 2
01(t)
2
1(t) + 2
0

2
1(t + 1) =
2
1(t)2
0
2
1(t) + 2
0
where similarly 2
i(t) is used as the shorthand for 2
ij	(t).
Substituting the posterior of 1 into Equation 4.7 gives the expected payoff of the
selected ad as
X1jx1(t);	(t)  N
 
1(t + 1);
2
0 + 
2
1(t + 1)

(4.10)
where recall that the prior noise 2
0 is assumed known.4.2. The Sequential Payoff Model 64
4.2.2 Correlated Ads
In the real world situation, the payoffs of ads are correlated. Similar products, using
similar creative, or targeting similar potential customers will generate similar payoffs.
By considering the correlation of ads the publisher could ﬁnd a more efﬁcient way of
identifying best candidates because not only the beliefs of the selected ads themselves
can be updated using Equation 4.10, but so do the other correlated ads. Again with
Bayes’ theorem and marginalizing 1 out, the p.d.f. of X2 conditioned on the observa-
tion x1(t) and previous available information 	(t) is obtained:
p(x2jx1(t);	(t))
=
Z
p(x2j2;x1(t);	(t))p(2jx1(t);	(t))d2 (4.11)
where
p(2jx1(t);	(t))
/ p(x1(t)j2;	(t))p(2j	(t))
= p(2j	(t))
Z
p(x1(t)j1;	(t))p(1j2;	(t))d1 (4.12)
With the covariance known, the conditional distribution of 1 on 2 is
1j2  N(1j2;
2
1j2) (4.13)
1j2 = 1 +
1;2
2
2
(2   2)

2
1j2 = 
2
1  
2
1;2
2
2
where 1;2 is the covariance of f1;2g. Substituting them into Equation 4.12 gives
2jx1(t)  N(2(t + 1);
2
2(t + 1)) (4.14)
2(t + 1) = 2(t) + 1;2
x1(t)   1(t)
2
1(t) + 2
0

2
2(t + 1) = 
2
2(t)  
2
1;2
2
1(t) + 2
0
Similarly substituting the posterior of 2 from Equation 4.14 to Equation 4.11 the4.2. The Sequential Payoff Model 65
expected payoff of the non-selected ad is obtained:
X2jx1(t);	(t)  N
 
2(t + 1);
2
0 + 
2
2(t + 1)

(4.15)
Note the correctness of the equation can be veriﬁed by setting the ﬁrst and second
ads equal – if 1 = 2 and 2
1 = 2
2 = 1;2, Equation 4.14 becomes exactly Equa-
tion 4.9. Therefore, Equation 4.14 is taken as the uniﬁed equation covering both self
and correlated updates. The objective function in Equation 4.6 is now completed with
the belief update formulas (constraints), all of which are now summarised together as
the following

 =argmax

T X
t=1
s(t)(t) (4.16)
subject to
s(t+1)(t + 1) = s(t+1)(t) + s(t);s(t+1)
xs(t)(t)   s(t)(t)
2
s(t)(t) + 2
0
(4.17)

2
s(t+1)(t + 1) = 
2
s(t+1)(t)  
2
s(t);s(t+1)
2
s(t)(t) + 2
0
(4.18)
Itisworthnoticingthattheupdatein Equation4.17iscloselyrelatedtothewordof
mouth heuristic adopted in collaborative ﬁltering [137, 138]. In the collaborative ﬁlter-
ing, particularly, the user-based ones, the rating of a target user is estimated by looking
at other similar users; The more similar a user is, the more contribution he or she would
have to the prediction. Using the heuristics, the ﬁnal rating prediction is a weighted
average across all similar users [138] and the similarity is usually measured by cosine
similarity or Pearson’s correlation coefﬁcient and user means are used to remove the
bias of mean ratings among users [137]. In this thesis, using a simple Gaussian model,
a collaborative update mechanism across correlated ads is naturally derived. The ma-
jor difference is that the update is in a sequential way. As seen in Equation 4.17, the
similarity measure here is the correlation normalized by the variance, and s(t+1)(t)
and s(t)(t) are used to remove the bias from the mean payoffs between different ads.
Moreover, Equation 4.18 naturally provides the conﬁdence of the predictions.
Optimising Equation 4.16 leads to the exploration and exploitation dilemma. The4.3. Solutions 66
publisher would like to earn more by selecting the best known s(t)(t) so far. However,
some ads with higher variances might potentially have higher payoffs. They also re-
quire to be selected in order to gather the feedback. Not selecting the local best may
result in a loss of the immediate reward, but the loss, however, could be compensated if
any better alternatives is found in later stages. Besides, the model deals with a changing
dataset naturally: the new coming ads could be assigned high variances to encourage
the exploration on them.
4.3 Solutions
This section provides both exact and approximate solutions to the proposed selection
problem. A toy example is introduced to illustrate the beneﬁt of using correlation.
4.3.1 Value Iteration
The revenue optimisation problem in Equation 4.16 could be solved exactly by follow-
ing a value iteration approach using Dynamic Programming [139]. Recall that  and 
denote the belief of N ads’ true payoffs before t = 1. Let V (;;T) denote the max
possible revenue the publisher could gain in T time steps. The following statement and
the Bellman equation [139] are obtained.
For any given priori  and , there exists an optimal policy  to the problem
in Equation 4.16, and V (;;T) is achievable. More over V (;;T) satisfy the
following condition
V
 (;;T)
= max
s(1)2N
E

Xs(t)(1) + V
  
jXs(t)(1);jXs(t)(1);T   1

(4.19)
By solving this equation recursively the optimal policy is found. If T = 1, the
optimal revenue is
V
(;;1) = max
s(1)2N
E

Xs(1)(1)

= max
s(1)2N
s(1)(1) (4.20)
which indicates that the publisher should simply choose the ad with highest expected
payoff. This choice is straightforward because no more time steps exist, thus no need4.3. Solutions 67
of exploration.
For T = 2 the optimal revenue is written as
V
(;;2)
= max
s(1)2N
E

Xs(1)(1) + V
  
jXs(t)(1);jXs(t)(1);1

= max
s(1)2N
Z
p(xs(1))
 
xs(1) + U(jxs(t)(1);jxs(t)(1);1)

dxs(1)
= max
s(1)2N
Z
p(xs(1))

xs(1) + max
s(2)2N
 
s(2)(2)

dxs(1)
= max
s(1)2N

s(1)(1) +
Z
max
s(2)2N
p(xs(1))s(2)(2)dxs(1)

(4.21)
The difﬁculty lies in the last integral as it depends on the max operator. Using
Chasles’ Relation [140], it could be expanded to several regional integrals according to
the random vector (2). For instance, if the publisher has to choose from only two ads,
and by solving 1(2) > 2(2) the following answer is obtained
1(2) > 2(2) when xi(1) > k (4.22)
which indicates the publisher should choose the ﬁrst ad when the observation from the
ﬁrst time step is bigger than some value k. Then the last integral of Equation 4.21 could
be broken into two regional integrals with exact solution
V
(;;2) = max
i21;2

1(1) +
Z k
 1
p(xi)2(2)dxi
+
Z +1
k
p(xi)1(2)dxi

(4.23)
The above equation could be easily extended to N ads cases provided the solution
of N inequalities for vector , where the only variable considered as unknown is the
observation from the last time step. For simplicity, let us deﬁne that a region is domi-
nated by some ad when the ad should be selected if the observation falls in the region.
This is similar with [125] where the value function is expressed as a linear combination
of -functions. Formally the region dominated by i-th ad at time step t is denoted as4.3. Solutions 68
[mi;t;ni;t]. For a general case of N ads, Equation 4.21 is written as
V
(;;2) = max
s(1)2N

s(1)(1) +
N X
s(2)
Z ns(2);2
ms(2);2
p(xi)s(2)(2)dxi

(4.24)
where the regional integral could be solved as
Z n
m
xp(x)dx =  
2

p(n)   p(m)

+ 

(n)   (m)

(4.25)
where (x) is the c.d.f. for the Gaussian random variable X. Note that for some ads
at some time steps, their dominant regions could be empty; simply indicating the ads
would never be selected under such circumstances.
4.3.1.1 A Toy Example
This section gives an example to demonstrate the sequential selection mechanism with
embedded correlated belief update. Assume a publisher have 2 ads to select from. The
Gaussian noise from users is given by

2
0 = 0:1 (4.26)
Random state  is deﬁned by a bivariate Gaussian, i.e.
  N(;) (4.27)
where
 =
2
6 6 6
4
1
0:95
3
7 7 7
5
 =
2
6 6 6
4
ten 0:2
0:2 50
3
7 7 7
5
(4.28)
Considering only one time step gives the expected revenue
V
(;;1) = max
s(1)2N
E

Xs(1)(1)

= max(1;0:95)
= 1 with s(1) = 1 (4.29)4.3. Solutions 69
Now consider T = 2. Suppose the ﬁrst ad at the ﬁrst time step is selected, which
yields the following update for time step t = 2
when s(1) = 1 : (4.30)
1(2) = 1  
ten  (1   x1(1))
0:1 + ten
2(2) = 0:95  
0:2  (1   x1(1))
0:1 + ten
which gives
1(2) > 2(2) when x1(1) > 0:95
Thus, the optimal reward for t = 2 when choosing s(1) = 1 could be derived as
V

s(1)=1(;;2)
=1 +
Z +1
0:95
p(x1)1(2)dx1 +
Z 0:95
 1
p(x1)2(2)dx1
=3:1993 (4.31)
A small defect is that variable x stands for the payoff observed from the ﬁrst time step,
and it cannot be smaller than zero. However, due to the Gaussian assumption, when
calculating V , x is integrated over the Real space and sometime results in a negative
expected reward. However, such policy would vanish in later comparisons due to its
low value and has little effect on our decision process.
Similarly selecting the second ad at the ﬁrst time step yields the following update
for step two
when s(1) = 2 : (4.32)
1(2) = 1  
0:2  (0:95   x2(1))
0:1 + 50
2(2) = 0:95  
50  (0:95   x2(1))
0:1 + 50
which gives
1(2) > 2(2) when x2(1) < 1:00 (4.33)4.3. Solutions 70
Thus
V

i=2(;;2)
=0:95 +
Z 1
 1
p(x2)1(2)dx2 +
Z +1
1
p(x2)2(2)dx2
=4:7291 (4.34)
Finally the maximum expected payoff over two time steps is
V
(;;2) = max(3:1993;4:7291) = 4:7291 (4.35)
and the corresponding optimal policy is

 = fs(1) = 2;s(2) = 1 if x1(1) < 1;s(2) = 2 otherwiseg (4.36)
The result shows that the optimal policy is clearly different from a myopic one,
which tries to maximise the immediate reward only. Following the myopic policy, the
publisher would choose s(1) = 1 and receive a smaller payoff. One of the reasons
of selecting the second is because it has a higher variance (taking into account the
correlations as well). In the experiment section, the real-world data suggests that high
variances are quite common.
4.3.2 Approximate Solution
To understand the approximations let us rewrite the objection function as a combination
of expected immediate reward and exploration function, which utilizes the available
information up to the decision time step, denoted by (	(t);i) for the i-th candidate.
The decisions maximise some the objective value function Vs(t)(	(t)), i.e.,
s(t) = argmax
s(t)2N
Vs(t)(	(t))
= argmax
i2N
( xi + (	(t);i)) (4.37)4.3. Solutions 71
Algorithm 1 The VI-COR algorithm using value iteration with Monte Carlo sampling.
function VALUEFUNC(;;t)
array V   0 . Expected reward vector.
loop i   1 to N
V [i]   i(t) . Expected immediate reward.
if t < T then
for all s in SAMPLE(;) do
[
0;
0]   UPDATEBELIEF(;;s;i)
. New belief after selecting i and observing s.
. Equations 4.17 and 4.18.
V [i]   V [i] + 1
M0VALUEFUNCTION(0;0;t + 1)
end for
end if
end loop
return [MAX(V );MAXINDEX(V )]
end function
Algorithm 2 The UCB1-NORMAL-COR algorithm using multi-armed bandit with cor-
related update.
function PLAN(;;	(t))
array V   0
loop i   1 to N
if ti < d8logte then
return i
end if
end loop
[
0;
0]   UPDATEBELIEF(;;	(t))
. New belief of all ads with all available information.
. Equations 4.17 and 4.18.
loop i   1 to N
V [i]   0
i +
q
16 
qi ti02
i
ti 1  t 1
ti
. Expected reward.
end loop
return [MAX(V );MAXINDEX(V )]
end function
For example, the exploration function in Equation 4.19 is
 =
Z
p(xs(1))V
  
jxs(t)(1);jxs(t)(1);T   1

dx (4.38)
of which the computation is expensive due to recursive calling and integral. The fol-
lowing of this section presents two approximate methods.4.3. Solutions 72
4.3.2.1 Value Iteration with Monte Carlo Sampling
For T  3 the solution for N inequalities cannot be obtained easily. Instead Monte
Carlo sampling is used to deal with the integral and avoid solving the inequalities. The
exploration function is written as
VI-COR =
1
M0
X
x2S
p(x)V
 (jx;jx;T   1)dx (4.39)
where S is the sample set and M0 is the normalizing factor from sampling. The algo-
rithm for a general T  3 case is represented in Algorithm 1. This algorithm is named
VI-COR in our experiments.
4.3.2.2 The UCB1-Normal-COR Algorithm
A problem to the above value iteration solution (with or without the MC sampling)
is the computational complexity. The run time of the algorithms is actual of O(NT)
where N is the number of candidates and T is the planning horizon. Usually in real-
world such complexity is unacceptable. In order to tackle this challenge this section
introduces a multi-armed bandit based approximation.
The multi-armed bandit is a popular model dealing with exploration-exploitation
dilemma in sequential optimisation problems [141]. Similar to the problem discussed
above, in the multi-armed bandit scenario a player must decide which arm to play at
each time step to maximise the cumulative reward over the entire planning horizon.
Most multi-armed bandit algorithms reduce the computational cost by approxi-
mating the exploration function. This thesis improve the performance of a determin-
istic policy UCB1-NORMAL [141] by adding the correlated update. The original algo-
rithm assumes the Gaussian distribution of the reward, independence between arms,
and underlying mean and variance for reward distribution are unknown but ﬁxed. The
exploration function of UCB1-NORMAL is written as
UCB1-NORMAL =
s
16 
qi   ti2
i(t)
ti   1

t   1
ti
(4.40)
where qi is the sum of squared reward obtained from i-th arm, and ti the times i-th has
been played so far. The algorithm is extended for by adding the correlated updates. The
exploration function would remain the same form, but (t) at each time step is updated4.4. Experiments and Results 73
according to Equations 4.17 and 4.18, instead of only updating the selected candidate.
The algorithm, referred to as UCB1-NORMAL-COR in the experiments, is represented
in Algorithm 2.
4.4 Experiments and Results
This section describes a real-world dataset collected from Google over a six months
period, then compare various algorithms mentioned before on this dataset. Some inter-
esting ﬁndings are reported in the end.
4.4.1 Dataset
The dataset was collected from Google AdWords Keyword Planner service [142]. Let
us consider the scenario that advertisers deploy campaigns through an advertiser (de-
mand) side platform, whereas online publishers retrieve ads and earn revenue from a
related supply side platform. Generally, online publishers share the ad revenues with
their chosen ad networks or exchanges with a ﬁxed percentage. For instance, online
publishers with Google AdSense gain 68% of advertisers’ spending, and the ratio has
remained the same since 2003 [143]. Thus, it is reasonable to consider online publish-
ers’ ad revenue to be proportional to the cost of the advertisers.
The test data was collected from 12/2011 to 5/2012. The Google AdWords Key-
word Planner service [142] provides nearly real-time data to help advertisers to adjust
budgets and select appropriate keywords. Given a keyword, budget, and targeting rules,
the service returns a list of ﬁelds including daily clicks, global and local impressions,
average position (of the ad list which usually has ﬁve to eight ads), average CPC, and
total cost. In addition, the US and UK markets are separated using the geographi-
cal targeting option. Estimation of keywords’ stats were collected across the Google
Sponsored Search and Display Networks. During the collection period, 521 different
keywords from various categories were used, and 310 of them have non-zero mean
payoffs. The mean and variance of all keywords are plotted in Figure 4.2, 4.3, and
4.4. As shown in Table 4.3, keywords are clustered into eight categories. In fact, it is
not necessary for publishers to try out all the available ads. Instead, they should specify
their target categories (based on hosting webpages content) and make optimal decisions
within the targeted categories. In the experiments, ads associating with the collected4.4. Experiments and Results 74
Table 4.1: The sample mean and variance of keyword prices in People & Organization dataset.
It clearly shows that some candidates have lower mean but very high variance, im-
plying short and strong bursts due to commercial advertising campaigns deployed
by advertisers.
Ad candidate Sample Mean Sample Variance
selena gomez 9.69 13567.30
eminem 22.44 74386.88
michael jackson 23.58 3003.34
justin bieber 27.70 27412.89
wayne rooney 31.06 350.87
Table 4.2: The sample correlation matrix for People & Organization category. The high corre-
lations made the UCB1 and UCB1-Normal inefﬁcient.
eminem justin bieber michael jackson selena gomez wayne rooney
eminem 1.00 -0.43 -0.58 -0.50 -0.73
justin bieber - 1.00 0.80 0.74 0.70
michael jackson - - 1.00 0.97 0.71
selena gomez - - - 1.00 0.63
wayne rooney - - - - 1.00
keywords are considered as candidates and decision making is on a daily basis.
4.4.2 Baselines and Experiments
The following policies have been compared in the experiments:
• RANDOM policy, which selects candidates randomly (uniform);
• MYOPIC policy, which selects candidates based on expected immediate reward;
• UCB1 policy, which assumes independent between candidates and is model-free
of reward distribution [141]; and
• UCB1-NORMAL policy, which assumes independent between candidates and the
reward following Gaussian distribution;
And the proposed algorithms:
• VI-COR policy, which uses value iteration with Monte Carlo sampling (Algo-
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Figure 4.2: The histogram of expected payoff of all candidate keywords.
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Figure 4.3: The histogram of variance of payoff of all candidate keywords.
• UCB1-NORMAL-COR policy, which consider the correlation of candidates (Al-
gorithm 2).
For each keyword, there are about 150 daily payoff data points (some keywords
have less due to a later start of collecting). For each category (except Uncategorised)
keywords are selected with close mean payoffs to form a dataset. In order to test the
statistical signiﬁcance of algorithms performance, the daily payoff time series were
divided into eight chunks for each dataset (with overlap). For each chunk, 20% was
used as the training set to get the prior belief of ad performances, i.e., (0) and (0).
Then the remaining 80% was run with each algorithm reporting the cumulative reward
at each time step. Besides, the averaged results are reported with Wilcoxon signed-
rank test [144] for the signiﬁcance of the best algorithm outperforming the second best
within each dataset.4.4. Experiments and Results 76
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Figure 4.4: The scatter plot of mean and variance of payoff of all candidate keywords.
Table 4.3: Categorisation of the collected 310 keywords with non-zero mean payoffs.
Category Count Category Count
Education 34 Person & organization 29
Shopping 86 (Personal) ﬁnance 51
Product & service 20 Information 52
Medical 25 Uncategorised 13
For each cluster candidates were chosen with the similar expectation, because
when the payoff differs too much the problem becomes trivial. For instance, in Ed-
ucation category the highest sample mean is 56:94 for android app developer while
the lowest is 0:29 for training indesign. Publisher would select the ﬁrst one without
any need of exploration, resulting in little discrimination of tested algorithms. There-
fore, candidates were chosen with relatively close means to emphasise exploration, for
instance, People & Organization dataset listed in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, which is
genuine in real-world provided that available ads are way more than 310 tested here.
4.4.3 Results and Discussions
The proposed two algorithms are compared with the others across the ten categories. In
order to compare performances across categories, the cumulative revenues have been
normalised against the GOLDEN solution (i.e., an oracle that always makes the best
decision). The results are summarized in Table 4.4 and are compared in Figure 4.5 and
4.6. They show that, within the ten different datasets, the proposed VI-COR algorithm4.4. Experiments and Results 77
Table 4.4: The overall performance comparison. The cumulative payoffs are averaged on 8
chunks then normalized w.r.t. the GOLDEN policy for a better representation. In each
row the one with highest cumulative payoff is in bold and with an  if the difference
with the second best is signiﬁcant.
Datasets MYOPIC RANDOM UCB1 UCB1-NORMAL VI-COR UCB1-NORMAL-COR
Education 21.9 23.0 30.9 30.9 41.2* 27.6
Finance-1 38.5 27.8 40.9 26.4 44.5 27.4
Finance-2 22.1 16.5 30.6 22.8 38.0* 22.9
Information 14.1 12.9 27.8 15.9 29.4 15.9
People & Organization 41.6 30.4 50.5 31.4 72.9* 63.3
Shopping-1 17.4 ten.6 42.3 16.1 40.2 16.4
Shopping-2 29.9 14.5 34.3 75.3 52.9 79.2*
Shopping-3 9.7 4.3 21.9 18.3 27.3 19.4
Product & Service 24.7 26.0 47.2 57.1 67.9* 59.9
Medical 30.5 19.6 52.7 32.2 58.0* 33.5
performed the best for 8/ten with 5/8 signiﬁcantly better. The UCB1-NORMAL-COR
algorithm performed the best for 1/ten and was signiﬁcantly better in that trail. With
the Shopping-1 dataset, the UCB1 algorithm performed the best, but the VI-COR had
the comparable performance, and the difference was not signiﬁcant.
In Figure 4.5 and 4.6 the daily performance comparison is given on Education and
People & Organization datasets where algorithm runs on entire payoff data series. The
interesting ﬁndings are discussed in the following sections.
4.4.3.1 The Importance of Exploration
First let us study the importance of exploration. Figure 4.5 and 4.6 compares the daily
accumulated revenues over time. As illustrated in Figure 4.5, in the beginning (between
day-0 and day-10) the MYOPIC policy achieved an excellent result, and its cumulative
payoff was the best until day-65. This is explained by the fact that there is no explo-
ration involved in this policy and it exploits the current belief directly. However, the
proposed algorithms with exploration quickly outperform it in the late stage as more
proﬁtable ads have been discovered from the exploration from the early stage. In the
end, the MYOPIC policy fails to win due to no exploration in the beginning, and later
stuck to suboptimal ads. It is similar in Figure 4.6 where the MYOPIC policy outper-
forms others between day-25 and day-35, but is caught up and passed very soon. These
conclude that the exploration is valuable and necessary in the ad selection task. Note4.4. Experiments and Results 78
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Figure 4.5: Comparing algorithms with correlated update with their baselines on Education
which has nine keywords.
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Figure 4.6: The performance of algorithms on People & organization which has ﬁve keywords.4.4. Experiments and Results 79
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Figure 4.7: Comparing accumulated payoffs on all ten categories. VI-COR always performed
better than MYOPIC and UCB1-NORMAL-COR always performed better than UCB1-
NORMAL across all datasets. The results prove the beneﬁt of correlated update.
that only Education and People & organization are illustrated, while the algorithms
behaved consistently across all categories.
4.4.3.2 The Importance of Correlation
Recall that a Gaussian noise constant is used for all webpages and users. The conse-
quence is that X1 and X2 are conditional independent when 1 and 2 are known. The
relationship between covariances of X1 and X2 and that of 1 and 2 can be further
derived as,
Cov[X1;X2] = E

Cov[X1;X2j1;2]

+ Cov

E[X1j1;2];E[X2j1;2]

= Cov[1;2] (4.41)
which enables publishers to use either of correlations within the model. In experiments
Cov[X1;X2] is used.
Like most multi-armed bandit models, the UCB1 algorithm assumes independence
between candidates. Therefore, when candidates have relatively low correlations, e.g.,4.4. Experiments and Results 80
0 50 100 150
0
50
100
150
Day
D
a
i
l
y
 
p
a
y
o
f
f
 
 
android app developer
apps development
Figure 4.8: The daily payoffs of two mobile development related ad candidates.
in Shopping-1, the algorithm would perform well. This is conﬁrmed by the observation
that the UCB1-NORMAL-COR algorithm reports only 0.3% improvement over UCB1-
NORMAL on that dataset. However, when the correlation of ads are high such as People
& Organization (a sample correlation matrix is shown in Table 4.2), the proposed algo-
rithms show better results. For instance the VI-COR algorithm shows 22.4% improve-
ment over the UCB1 and the UCB1-NORMAL-COR shows 31.9% improvement over the
UCB1-NORMAL on that dataset. In Figure 4.6 it is clear that UCB1-NORMAL-COR dis-
covers the better options much quicker than UCB1-NORMAL. The same conclusion is
obtained by comparing VI-COR with MYOPIC. Figure 4.7 shows signiﬁcant improve-
ment by utilising correlation of ads. The maximum uplift was obtained in Product &
service (43.3%), and on average it was 22.2% across all experiments.
4.4.3.3 The Impact of the Noise Factor 2
0
The introduction of the noise factor 2
0 is an essential part of proposed models. On
one hand, it helps to capture the uncertainty which is unforeseeable and has not been
properly modelled by the underlying  and  as discussed before. The assumption
about the Gaussian distribution may not be accurate in practice. This can be seen
from Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9. The noise factor provides the ﬂexibility of tuning
proposed algorithms towards particular situations. In the experiments, the noise factor4.4. Experiments and Results 81
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Figure 4.9: The daily payoff of two candidates with a sudden change.
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Figure 4.10: The impact of the noise factor 2
0 for the situation in Figure 4.9.
was obtained by tuning using training datasets (20% of all data points).
On the other hand, the noise factor is also a control of the sensitivity of the algo-
rithms towards the unexpected daily payoff ﬂuctuation. Equations 4.17 and 4.18 show
that the noise factor is in the denominator, and a high noise factor leads to a steady4.5. Adaptive Keywords Extraction 82
policy while a low one leads to a highly responsive (sensitive) policy. A smaller value,
for example, 2
0 = 0:01, would make the algorithm switch probably too much, whereas
a larger value would not be able to capture the ﬂuctuation of the data. The dataset
suggests that sometimes there could be sharp bursts, led by commercial activities. For
instance, at the beginning of May, 2012 the Sumsang Galaxy S III and Nokia 808 Pure-
View were launched for pre-ordering or purchasing, and both claimed to be the ‘best’
on the market. The competition of commercial campaigns cause the daily payoff of
best phones became very high between 15/04/2012 and 05/05/2012 (Figure 4.9). In
order to response to such a short and strong abnormal activity a small noise factor is
required. Figure 4.10 shows that with 2
0  40 the VI-COR algorithm is able to identify
and switch to best phones when the burst happened; but with 2
0  60 the algorithm is
not able to switch, resulting in a loss of payoff.
It is worth noticing that, as illustrated in Figure 4.10, the setting of the noise factor
is algorithm-dependent as well. UCB1-NORMAL-COR requires a large noise value to
deal with bursts — the best cumulative payoff was obtained at 2
0 = 40, and as the value
of the noise factor decreased the performance dropped greatly. The different behaviour
of two algorithms is due to the different structures of the exploration function. As
shown in Equation 4.40, the exploration function of the UCB1-NORMAL-COR contains
the squared expectation of the payoffs in the past, indicating that the candidate with a
history of low payoffs would not be favoured especially with a sudden burst. Using a
high noise value would increase the chance of selecting and exploring such candidates.
4.5 Adaptive Keywords Extraction
In some cases, publishers could retrieve different ads from the same source by using
different keywords. This creates an additional problem after selecting an ad source:
to explore and exploit keywords that generate the most revenue. The proposed system
was created to accomplish a real-world task (keyword extraction for parked domains),
however, the idea could be easily adopted by any general keyword extraction from
various sources.
From the publishers’ perspective, the process of extracting keywords is illustrated
in Figure 4.12. It is an iterative process of selecting candidates and update the model
according to the feedback. This task of extracting keywords against user feedback4.5. Adaptive Keywords Extraction 83
Figure 4.11: An example of advertising on parked domains. Instead of showing an error or
under construction, relevant ads are displayed.
select keywords 
from the context retrieve ads observe reward
(score/clicks/revenue) update the model
Figure 4.12: The keyword extraction task could be an iterative process. The publisher would
like to exploit current optimal keywords as well as to explore potentially better
ones.
directly links to the multi-armed bandits problem. The linear multi-armed bandits [145,
146, 147, 148] used in this thesis is a special case of (contextual) bandits. It has the
same setting with standard bandits except the availability of the side information. The
sideinformationofeacharmdeterminestherewardforpullingthearm, therefore, could
be used to make decisions. This section mainly exploits text features from webpages
under domains being evaluated, including TF-IDF scores in title, content, keyword and
description in HTML meta tag, header, anchor text of in-links, and part of speech.
First of all let us deﬁne reward of iteration step t 2 [0;T] as a real number in [0,1],
r(t) 2 [0;1] (4.42)
The reward could be in various form, for example,
• Relevance scores of selected keywords against the webpage;
• The click-through rates (CTR) of ads, or4.5. Adaptive Keywords Extraction 84
• Proﬁt gained in each iteration.
Apparently the relevance scores, CTRs and proﬁt are linked, however not guaranteed
with any linear/non-linear relationship.
This section uses human judged relevance score for simplicity, also due to the
difﬁculty of acquiring necessary data of CTR and proﬁt. Besides, the crowdsourcing
approach is employed to get the feedback in a cheap and fast way. Each webpage is
considered a K-armed bandit machine and every arm a word (or multi-word phrase).
In each iteration, an arm will be pulled resulting in the selection of the corresponding
word/phrase to be the keywords of the webpage. Different from standard bandits, each
arm (i 2 K) of the linear bandits is associated with some D-dimension feature vector
xi 2 RD1 which is already known. The expected reward (user feedback) is given
by the inner product of its feature vector xi and some ﬁxed, but initially unknown
parameter (column) vector w. That is, the reward is a linear function of the feature
vector and unknown parameters,
ri = xi
0  w (4.43)
The goal here is to get the optimal reward. The proposed solution is the LIN-
REL algorithm [148] highlighting upper conﬁdence bound (UCB) to deal with the
exploration-exploitation dilemma.
4.5.1 Upper Conﬁdence Bound Algorithm
The idea of LINREL algorithm is to estimate the reward for the i-th arm from the
linear combination of the historical reward received, with a high probability. Here the
LINREL algorithm is expanded to help the thesis self-contained. First let us write the
feature vector of the i-th arm as the linear combination of the previous chosen feature
vectors (this is always possible except for the initial d iteration steps),
xi(t) = X(t)  ai(t) (4.44)4.5. Adaptive Keywords Extraction 85
where ai(t) 2 Rt1 is the coefﬁcient of the linear combination and X(t) is the feature
matrix selected in past iteration steps with dimension D  t,
X(t) = [x(1);x(2);:::;x(t   1)] (4.45)
where the x(t) denotes the feature vector used in t iteration step (the decisions are
known but the subscripts are dropped for simplicity). With the same coefﬁcient the
reward could be written as,
ri(t) = xi(t)
0  w = (X(t)  ai(t))
0  w = R(t)
0  ai(t) (4.46)
where R(t) 2 Rt1 is a vector of historical reward,
R(t) = [r(1);r(2);:::;r(t   1)]
0 (4.47)
This gives a good estimate R(t)ai(t) for ri(t). The algorithm keeps the variance small
to maintain a narrow conﬁdence interval of the estimate. By assuming i.i.d. of ri(t)
(which is true for the keywords extraction task) and since ri(t) 2 [0;1] the variance of
this estimate is bounded by kai(t)k2=4.
To get ai(t), let us calculate the eigenvalue decomposition,
X(t)  X(t)
0 = U(t)
0  [1;2;:::;d]  U(t) (4.48)
where U(t) is a unitary matrix and 1;:::;k  1 and k+1;:::;d < 1. Then for
each feature vector xi(t) write,
zi(t) = U(t)  xi(t) = [xi;1(t);xi;2(t);:::;xi;d(t)]
0 (4.49)
ui(t) = [xi;1(t);:::;xi;k(t);0;:::]
0 (4.50)
vi(t) = [0;:::;xi;k+1(t);:::;xi;d(t)]
0 (4.51)
The coefﬁcient ai(t) is calculated as,
ai(t) = ui(t)
0  [
1
1
; ;
1
k
; ;0]  U(t)  X(t) (4.52)4.5. Adaptive Keywords Extraction 86
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Figure 4.13: The architecture of the RAZORCLAW prototype system. The system is divided
into three main parts. In every part, there are loosely bounded modules with each
for a single task. These modules could be changed or updated ﬂexibly. This thesis
intents to create an open framework for the keywords extraction task.
Then with probability of 1   =T the expected reward of i-th arm is,
ucbi(t) = R(t)  ai(t) +  (4.53)
where  is the width of the conﬁdence bounds by using Azuma-Hoeffding bound [149],
 = kai(t)k(
p
ln(2TK=) + kvi(t)k (4.54)
where  is used to conﬁne a narrow conﬁdence interval and recall K is the number
of arms. The arm with highest ucbi(t) score will be selected. Apparently the arm
got selected because the combination of its expected reward (R(t)  ai(t)) or potential
reward () is high. The former leads to exploitation and the latter results in exploration.
4.5.2 Prototype System
A prototype system RAZORCLAW was built according to the model discussed above.
The system is implemented in Java. Its architecture is illustrated in Figure 4.13. The
prototype system is made of three main parts: a crawler, a parser, and a ranker. In the4.5. Adaptive Keywords Extraction 87
parsing engine, different modules will be used for different languages.
In the crawling module, the RAZORCLAW ﬁrst loads meta information from the
parked domain database, including the anchor texts and referrer URLs collected from
the Internet. The webpage is crawled, too. The next step is to detect the correct encod-
ing of the text (sometimes not presented in HTML) and the language. The language
detector used in the system2 is based on the naive Bayesian ﬁlter and has reported 99%
precision over 49 languages.
Once the encoding and language are detected the content is converted to UTF-8
and invoke corresponding NLP processor. OpenNLP3 was used for major western lan-
guages and IKAnalyzer4 for Chinese-Japanese-Korean-Vietnam languages. The lan-
guage support is not the main point of the system; however, it processes more than 50
languages. This is especially useful for free domain services, where a good amount of
registrations are found from south east Asia, India, and Arabic countries.
After stemming, removing stopwords, tagging part-of-speech (POS), and saving
the inverted-document-frequency (IDF), each phrase in the bag-of-words is processed
to generate its local feature vector and to retrieve historical features and rewards. Ac-
cording to the ranking result, the system then gives the required number of keywords.
4.5.3 Datasets and Competing Algorithms
The experiments used 165 domains from DOT.TK’s database and collected all pos-
sible side information. The proposed prototype system was compared with BM25F
algorithm [150], KEA algorithm5 [151], Yahoo! Term Extraction service6 and Google
Targeting Idea service7.
The parameters of BM25F algorithm were obtained from the work of [150]. KEA
is a famous keywords extraction tool in academic research. It is capable of extraction
keywords with domain-speciﬁc knowledge, for example with Wikipedia article names.
However, in the experiments domains were selected randomly and not restricted to any
particular area.
Both web services require registration as a developer and incur a cost if exceeding
2http://code.google.com/p/language-detection
3http://incubator.apache.org/opennlp
4http://code.google.com/p/ik-analyzer
5www.nzdl.org/kea
6goo.gl/KXaPw
7goo.gl/CpNgp4.5. Adaptive Keywords Extraction 88
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Figure 4.14: The performance comparison of competing algorithms and services.
the free quota. According to the speciﬁcation, text content of webpages (including the
title and meta) were sent to the Yahoo! service and URLs to the Google one.
4.5.4 Crowdsourcing Based Experiments and Results
To carry out the evaluation in an efﬁcient and cheap fashion, a popular crowdsourc-
ing platform was employed to judge the results of multiple algorithms. A test was
conducted on oDesk.com and 23 human assessors who passed the test were randomly
selected. Then they were asked to rank the relevance between the domain and keywords
on a one (least relevance) to ﬁve (most relevance) scale. Very detailed instructions were
given to help keep the ranking as consistent as possible among different assessors and
in different iteration steps. For broken links or empty keywords (some algorithm failed
to give the result) the assessors were asked to give a zero. oDesk.com was chosen for
its simplicity, openness, big candidate pool, and various tools to monitor the progress.
Traps were designed, screenshots and remote desktop monitoring were used to reduce
fraud and malicious behaviours. Among the returns three users were marked careless
(by trigging three out of ten traps) and their results were completely removed.
There were six iterations of experiments in total, on 7th June, 17th July, 4th Au-
gust, 11th August, 15th August, and 20th August 2011. The comparison of compet-
ing algorithms is reported in Figure 4.14. As introduced above, the relevance rank-
ing ranges from 0-5 with 0 is speciﬁcally for failures (website did not open, encoding
or language was not recognised, or other issues resulting in failure of extracting key-4.5. Adaptive Keywords Extraction 89
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Figure 4.15: The evolution of weights of some features of the proposed system. Features with
too small weights are not included here. The initial weights were obtained from
the work of [150]. The result showed that the content of webpage is the most in-
ﬂuential factor, followed by part-of-speech and title. The keyword and description
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Figure 4.16: Measuring the agreement for crowdsourcing ranking results. The fair in Fleiss’
kappa corresponds to 0.2.
words). In every iteration, each domain was ranked by at least two assessors.
First the overall precision (cumulative relevance ranking against the highest possi-4.6. Conclusions 90
ble score) is compared. Figure 4.14 shows that RAZORCLAW performed better than the
second best (KEA), with 8.29% behind in the ﬁrst iteration, but 13.6% improvement in
the last one.
Fromtheprecisionplottheimprovementof RAZORCLAW isclearlyobservable. At
iteration 2 and four the algorithm performed worse than the previous round, suffering
from the exploration. However, the algorithm was able to pick up new sets of weights
of features as anticipated. Figure 4.15 shows that the corresponding evolution of the
weights. In the ﬁgure, top 6 features are listed but ones with too small weights are
not included. The content was the most inﬂuential factor, followed by part-of-speech
and title. The keyword from the HTML meta tag is, in fact, not trustworthy, which is
consistent with the no-use decision in major search engines like Google [152]. The
measurement of agreement is plotted in Figure 4.16. The average of Cohen’s kappa
of any two assessors is reported for each iteration. Similarly the Fleiss’ kappa of all
assessors of each iteration is plotted. The agreement of results is generally satisfying.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter presents a model of optimally selecting ads in an online setting. Based
on POMDPs, the belief updates are formulated by taking the correlation of ads into ac-
count. It is mathematically show that the belief update across ads is similar to the word
of month principle employed in collaborative ﬁltering. To make use of the correlated
belief update two approximate methods are proposed: one is derived from the Value
Iteration and Sampling approach, whereas the other is based on the Upper Conﬁdence
Bound solution. The empirical experiments compare the proposed algorithms with var-
ious baselines using a real-world dataset and show that the Bayesian inference with
correlations makes the exploration more efﬁcient and signiﬁcantly uplifts the payoff.
This chapter also proposes and evaluates an adaptive keyword extraction system,
as a complement for pulling ads from various sources, since there are still many ad
sources that allow manipulating the output by providing keywords. The system is de-
signed based on BM25F and multi-armed bandits models and has been evaluated by
crowdsourcing techniques. The iterated experiments showed good performance of pro-
posed algorithm and exposed important most features (content and part-of-speech).Chapter 5
Reserve Price Optimisation
Revenue from ad exchanges [153] which use Real-Time Bidding (RTB) is getting more
andmoreimportanttoonlinepublishers. InRTB,apublishergeneratesabidrequestfor
each impression in real-time and then sends a request to advertisers via ad exchanges.
Advertisersthencalculateandsubmitbidsforthisimpressionusingbiddingalgorithms.
In this process, the reserve price is one of the most powerful tools for the supply
side to manipulate auctions [31]. A reserve price deﬁnes the minimum that a publisher
would accept from bidders. It reﬂects the publisher’s private valuation of the inventory;
bids will never be accepted if they are below the reserve price. In the second price
auction, which is commonly used in RTB, the reserve price could potentially uplift the
revenue. Figure 5.1 illustrates how the ﬁnal price is calculated in an auction with a
reserve price. Let b1;:::;bK denote the descending bids and  the reserve price. Then,
the desirable case is b1   > b2 where the publisher gains additional revenue of
   b2; the neutral case is b1 > b2   where the publisher has no extra gain; and the
undesirable case is  > b1 where the publisher suffers from a loss of b2. These cases
directly motivate the work of this chapter.
Note that in practice, publishers can choose to disclose or hide reserve prices in
bid requests. When a reserve price is present, most advertisers would still return bids
even when the bids are lower than the disclosed reserve. This helps to avoid the time-
out penalty (a penalty for bidders not responding in time, used to protect bidders from
being ﬂooded) which would reduce the bid request volume over time.
This optimisation problem has been studied in the context of sponsored
search [154, 155, 37, 38] by using the optimal auction theory or machine learning
techniques. However, the problem in the RTB context is different and unique. First, the5.1. Related Works 92
optimal auction theory requires knowing the distribution of the advertisers’ private yet
true assessments of the impression before calculating the optimal reserve price [154].
In RTB, it becomes a lot harder to learn the distribution. An advertiser is required
to submit a bid for each impression using proprietary algorithms, which are never
disclosed to publishers and could rely heavily on privately-owned audience proﬁles
(a.k.a., users’ interest segments). Besides, various practical constraints such as the
budget, campaigns’ lifetime, irrationality, divert advertisers from bidding at private
values. This difference makes the private value based algorithm inefﬁcient in prac-
tice. Thus, it is of great interest to empirically study the subject and examine several
commonly adopted algorithms in the real-world as reported in this chapter.
Second, unlike sponsored search, an advertiser does not have the keyword con-
straint and faces almost unlimited supply of impressions in RTB. Setting up an aggres-
sive reserve price could easily drive the advertisers away from those placements and
force them to look for something similar but cheaper. This possible consequence is
analysed in the online experiments and the attrition hypothesis is rejected in today’s
RTB marketplace, which could be due to the complexity of the experiment schedul-
ing or less sensitivity of common bidding algorithms. The little attrition implies good
chance of implementing the optimisation in the current ecosystem.
This chapter presents the ﬁrst ﬁeld study of RTB auctions and discuss the re-
serve price optimisation in this context. The empirical study is based on the analysis
of real-world data from a production platform. Thorough discussions about the com-
monly adopted algorithms for reserve price optimisation are included, including both
the private-value-free and the private-value-based ones [36, 154, 37], and their varia-
tions. At last, large-scale online experiments were conducted to test these algorithms.
The results suggest that the proposed game theory based ONESHOT algorithm per-
formed the best, and the superiority (12.3% on average) is signiﬁcant in most cases.
5.1 Related Works
Up to now the reserve price problem has mainly been studied in the sponsored search
(SS) ﬁeld. For instance, in [37], the authors have studied the reserve price problem
in a real-world online advertising system (Yahoo! sponsored search). The authors
test optimal auction theory on 450k keywords and the results diverge by number of5.1. Related Works 93
Figure 5.1: The decision process of second price auctions on the publisher side. The desirable
case is b1   > b2 where the publisher gains extra payoff of  b2. The soft ﬂoor
prices is ignored to avoid making the process a lot more complicated.
impressions: for keywords with high search volume the uplift on revenue is good and
statisticallysigniﬁcant. However, forotherkeywordsthetotalrevenuedeclinesby2.2%
on average. This result is consistent with the experiment results in this chapter, that is,
the optimisation may not be helpful when there are very few bidders. Additionally, the
bidders’ attrition analysis was conducted which could be more important in RTB.
In [154] the optimal auction problem is characterised for sponsored search. The
authors demonstrate the calculation of optimal reserve price for multi-item auctions
and conclude that the optimum is independent of the number of bidders. However,
in [38] the authors suggest that both the number of bidders and ad links affect the op-
timal reserve price. Some assumptions are made in the ﬁrst paper [154]: advertisers
know their value per click; they have the same Click-Through Rate (CTR) at a given
position; they share the common knowledge of position CTRs; they all maximise the
expected proﬁt. These assumptions might be realistic when search engines bids for ad-
vertisers, but however are far from achievable in RTB. Also in the SS context, in [155]
the advertiser-speciﬁc reserve price is discussed in both the generalised second-price
auction (GSP) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction [8] settings. As proved
in the paper the advertiser-speciﬁc reserve prices could result in losing truthfulness in
the VCG pricing; but could lead to envy-free equilibrium in the GSP pricing.
The reserve price study is planned in the RTB environment. In [153] the abstract
model of an ad exchange is proposed and several problems are discussed, including
auction mechanism, call out optimisation [156], publisher revenue optimisation [157],
arbitrage bidding and risk analysis [158]. As suggested by the authors, the reserve
price problem takes an essential role in yield optimisation yet remains unsolved. In
this thesis, the problem is studied at placement-level (a group of impressions); the
impression-level dynamic reserve prices (e.g., user-speciﬁc) is left to the future works.5.2. An Empirical Study of RTB Auctions 94
There is also rich literature from bidders’ perspective on how to bid when a ran-
domised reserve price in ad network is present [58, 159]. The optimal auction design
is studied in [159] with two layers: central seller to intermediaries and intermediaries
to bidders. The authors conclude that revenue-maximizing intermediaries will use an
auction with a randomized reserve price chosen from an interval in equilibrium, and the
optimal reserve price decreases with the number of buyers. In this chapter, although no
intermediary is employed, the relationship of the optimal reserve price and number of
bidders is observed and discussed.
Due to the similarity in mechanisms, RTB also can borrow a lot from established
research on auction theories [160, 161, 162], esp. electronic commerce [163, 164].
In [165] the detection and reaction towards reserve prices cheating are ﬁrst discussed
for online auctions. The authors of [162] discuss the situation that an item could be
resold if previous auctions fail due to high reserve price. An equilibrium reserve price
was proven to approach the one in an optimal static auction. Meanwhile, there are
papers on scoring inventories [67] considering unique characteristics of RTB auctions
(e.g., number of bidders, bid time, bidders’ identity). However, few of them take the
reserve price into account.
5.2 An Empirical Study of RTB Auctions
An empirical study was conducted to understand the unique features of RTB auctions.
The study looks at the bidders’ lifetime, bidding pattern across a day, the measurement
of advertising performance, etc. The knowledge gained from the study is especially
helpful to understand the drawbacks of optimal auction theory in RTB practice. It also
inspires the design of the one-shot game based reserve price optimisation model in the
following section.
This section ﬁrst reports the statistics of dataset used in the empirical study and
some general analysis on bidders and bids. Then it discusses three aspects (bidding
behaviour, bids’ distribution, frequency and recency) and associated problems (reserve
price detection, daily pacing, and selective bidding).5.2. An Empirical Study of RTB Auctions 95
5.2.1 Datasets
The study was carried out in a production ad exchange based in the UK. Datasets were
created both for demand and supply side. However, these two datasets are independent
thus not linked together in the empirical study.
For advertisers, impression, click, and conversion logs from Feb to May 2013
were sampled. In total there are 52,850,635 impressions, 72,958 clicks, and 37,978
conversions. Note that only the conversions were sampled then back traced to ﬁnd the
associated clicks and impressions. Since these datasets were sampled, various reports
(e.g., analytical performance, site domain, attributed conversions, frequency/recency
distribution, and so on) were also used to measure the performance of advertisers.
Auction logs were recorded, too, for placements from registered publishers of the
same ad exchange. In total, there are sampled 12,965,119 auctions from 50 place-
ments, ranging from Dec 2012 to May 2013. These placements are from 16 websites
of different categories, including news, ﬁnance, pc & console games, gadgets, sports,
entertainment, and so on. Auction logs were sampled to suit the limited computational
and storage capability. Therefore, various reports were used to measure the overall
performance of publishers.
5.2.1.1 Periodic Patterns
Due to the typical human daily routine there are always periodic patterns of activity.
Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 show clear daily patterns of both impressions and clicks from
a single website. For the number of impressions, there was also a weak weekly pattern
that during weekends fewer visitors came to the website. There was also a daily pattern
for conversions: during daytime the numbers of conversions were larger and the CVRs
were higher compared to sleeping hours, c.f. Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.4.
Note that there are two types of conversions: post-click that the user saw an im-
pression, clicked, and ﬁnally converted (while remaining on the advertiser’s website
and without any interruption); post-view that the user saw an impression, but did not
click, but still converts (by visiting the website later on directly). These two types were
plotted separately.5.2. An Empirical Study of RTB Auctions 96
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Figure 5.2: The normalised impression time series snippet by hour. A deﬁnite daily pattern and
less clear weekly pattern, that fewer visitors come to the website, can be observed.
The data is from a single website, but the pattern is very similar for all websites
which were evaluated. The green dotted line denotes the impressions from the
front page; the red segmented line denotes the impressions from the second-level
pages (i.e., those are linked directly from the front page).
5.2.1.2 The Soft Floor Price
In modern ad exchanges, publishers are usually given the option to set a soft ﬂoor price
ps along with a hard ﬂoor price (the traditional reserve price) ph. The auction process
is illustrated in Figure 5.6. However, note that the business requires that the soft ﬂoor
to be either higher than the hard ﬂoor or zero. By setting a high soft ﬂoor price (e.g.,
$1000 CPM), the publisher can change the mechanism from the second price to the ﬁrst
priceauction, whichalwayschargesthewinnertheamountthathebids. Unlikethehard
ﬂoor, advertisers usually are not aware of the existence of soft ﬂoor prices, especially
in RTB environment where the available inventory is unknown before bidding.
The ratio of the effective ﬁrst price auction and the second price auction in the
dataset was checked, using impression logs that include bid price and price paid. There
was no explicit indicator of the auction mechanism being employed. Thus, a simple
heuristic was used: when bid price = price paid, it was considered ﬁrst price5.2. An Empirical Study of RTB Auctions 97
05-03 05-04 05-05 05-06 05-07 05-08 05-09 05-10 05-11 05-12 05-13
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
05-13 05-14 05-15 05-16 05-17 05-18 05-19 05-20 05-21 05-22 05-23
day
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
n
o
r
m
a
l
i
s
e
d
 
c
l
i
c
k
s
total
first screen
second screen
Figure 5.3: The normalised click time series snippet by hour from the same website as of Fig-
ure 5.2. A daily pattern with lots of noises exists, too. Other websites had the very
similar pattern.
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Figure 5.4: The distribution of normalised post-view and post-click Conversion Rate (CVR)
against time. The plot was created using all conversions in the demand-side dataset.
The error bar shows the standard deviation. The plot shows that the CVRs were
higher during wake hours.
auction. In total, there were about 40% impressions bought in ﬁrst price auctions.
However, these impressions accounted for 55.4% of the total advertisers’ budget.5.2. An Empirical Study of RTB Auctions 98
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Figure 5.5: The distribution of number of post-view and post-click conversions against time.
The plot was created using all conversions in the demand-side dataset.
To my best knowledge this mixture of auction mechanisms is mostly unaware
of. Needless to mention the counter measure from advertisers. In different types of
auctions advertisers have different optimal bidding strategies [166]. Speciﬁcally, in a
second price auction an advertiser should bid his private value; while in a ﬁrst price
auction he should bid lower than the private value. Thus, the mixture, as illustrated
in Figure 5.6, puts advertisers in a not favourable position (i.e., bidding sub-optimally
by assuming it is always the second price auction). It hurts the campaign performance
and could damage the advertising eco-system in long term. From the advertisers’ per-
spective, it is worth exploring the ﬂoor prices setting of different publishers and act
accordingly. For example, the winner may choose to lower his bid (while still winning)
to reduce the cost in a high soft ﬂoor scenario (the ﬁrst price auction). Meanwhile, the
advertiser who could react to its competitors’ moves fastest has a substantial advan-
tage [8]. However, if it’s the second price auction, the exploration activities only incur
unnecessary cost.
5.2.2 Bidding Behaviours
This section studies the advertisers’ bidding behaviour to provide a better understand-
ingoftheRTBecosystem. Particularly, itanalysesthebids’distributionsandthepacing
settings of a daily budget.5.2. An Empirical Study of RTB Auctions 99
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Figure 5.6: An illustration of the auction process in modern ad exchanges with both hard and
soft ﬂoors. The business requires that the soft ﬂoor to be either higher than the
hard ﬂoor or zero. The auction mechanisms are mixed and extended by introduc-
ing the soft ﬂoor price. The impact of such mixture is mostly unaware of. This
complicated setting puts advertisers in an unfavourable position and could damage
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Figure 5.7: The bids’ distribution test at placement level. Only bids from 3 out of 44 place-
ments (6.82%) accept the Uniform distribution hypothesis. The Uniform distri-
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randomly sampled of 1000 auctions. Only the Log-normal distribution is tested by
Anderson-Darling test.
5.2.2.1 Bids’ Distribution Test
A key assumption made by the optimal auction theory is that bidders draw their private
values from a monotonically increasing distribution. In second price auctions, they bid
at their private values; thus, the distribution of bids reﬂects their individual valuations5.2. An Empirical Study of RTB Auctions 101
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Figure 5.9: Hourly average winning bids and bursts on a placement of high level of competi-
tion. Since the placement is static, the change of bids is mostly likely due to the
usage of audience data.
of an impression. As introduced in Chapter 2 researchers often assume bidders are
symmetric, and bids follow Log-normal or Uniform distribution. This assumption then
becomes the core of optimal auction theory based algorithms of computing reserve
prices [36, 37, 38].
In this empirical study, bids were ﬁtted to these two distributions. For the Log-
normal distribution, bids’ normality was checked using Anderson-Darling test [167]
after taking the logarithm. This test was performed at both the auction level and place-
ment level. For the Uniform distribution, the Chi-squared test [168] was used only at
the placement level. P-value< 0:05 is used to reject the null hypothesis.
The results are reported in Figure 5.8 and 5.7. Clearly only the acceptance of
Uniform distribution assumption at placement level is noticeable yet still at a low ratio
of 6.82%. The poor results are probably due to the bursts and randomness of bids as
illustrated in Figure 5.9. However, to be consistent with the research literature and due
to the limited time, the Log-normal assumption was adopted when implementing the
optimal auction theory based algorithm in the experiments.5.2. An Empirical Study of RTB Auctions 102
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Figure 5.10: The distribution of the number of bidders and impressions against hour-of-day.
Their correlation plot shows a clear lag when they reach the maximum in a day.
This lag indicates the unbalance of supply and demand of the market in some
hours. Besides, the fact that there are more bidders in the morning may be due
to a mixture of hour-of-day targeting and no daily pacing setup. The plots used
three months worth of data sampled from a single placement. Note that for some
placements the lag was not very clear.
5.2.2.2 The Daily Pacing
The daily pacing refers to the way that advertisers spend their budget in a single day.
Usually an advertiser submits a daily budget for his campaign, and chooses from spend-
ing it evenly throughout a day (uniform pacing) and as fast as possible (no pacing). The
no pacing option may lead to a premature stop easily, which means the budget depletes
too quickly so advertisers cannot capture trafﬁc later in the day, that may have high-
quality impressions. An instance of premature stop is illustrated in Figure 5.11 (day 1).
The uniform pacing also suffers from the trafﬁc problem: if high quality impressions
appear in early part of the day, the pacing setup would not be able to capture all of
them; if there is not enough trafﬁc in the late part of the day, the pacing setup would not
be able to spend all the budget (usually called under-delivery). In sum, although being
widely used in DSPs they are not good daily pacing strategies.5.2. An Empirical Study of RTB Auctions 103
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Figure 5.11: An interesting instance: an advertiser switched from no pacing to even daily pac-
ing. He was bidding at a ﬂat CPM. With ad exchanges, the large amount of avail-
able inventories could deplete the budget quickly. However, even daily pacing is
far from optimal because it does not consider the performance in different time
slots. Note that in practice the pacing engine would spend slightly more at the be-
ginning of the day to learn the available impressions and to calculate the spending
speed, especially for campaigns with small budgets.
Figure 5.10 shows the hourly mean of the number of bidders and impressions,
which are normalised respectively. There is an obvious lag when these two series reach
their maximum in a day. Generally speaking, the number of bidders peaks in the morn-
ing but the number of impressions peaks afterwards. This lag indicates the unbalance
of supply and demand of the market in particular hours. For example, there are more
bidders competing over limited impressions in the morning, resulting in high winning
bids as shown in Figure 5.10, which in turn costs more of advertisers. However, this
higher cost does not necessarily lead to higher performance. Figure 5.4 shows that both
post-view and post-clicks CVR peak in the evening, which argues that intense bidding
activities in the early hours are not reasonable.
This distribution of bidders throughout a day may be due to a mixture of hour-of-
day targeting and no daily pacing setup. Most of the advertisers wish to skip the last5.2. An Empirical Study of RTB Auctions 104
night hours because of the low CVR. Some of them may use the no pacing option to
avoid the risk of under-delivery as discussed before. When these bidders start to bid in
the morning, they win lots of impressions with high bids, and they quit as their budgets
depletes quickly. The validation of this hypothesis is left to the future work.
A reasonable alternative is the dynamic pacing against the performance. It is intu-
itively correct to spend more budget in hours that generate more clicks or conversions,
and less in low performing hours.
Note that this problem is not the same as a typical budgeted multi-arm bandit
problem that has been discussed extensively in the literature [169, 170, 171]:
1. In this allocation problem the advertiser can only explore the current time step;
2. There is potential over or under-delivery in a time step due to the latency in the
practical implementation.
Therefore, re-distributing the remaining budget is required after every time step.
5.2.3 Conversion Rates and Performance Measurement
Considering the maintenance cost (e.g., servers and bandwidth) it is not wise for an
advertiser to submit a bid every time he receives a bidding request. Among various fac-
tors that he uses to decide to bid or not, the frequency and recency factors are common
and important ones.
5.2.3.1 The Frequency Factor
The frequency factor (or frequency cap, FC) deﬁnes how many times ads (a.k.a., cre-
atives) would be displayed to a single user. It can be applied to campaign groups, cam-
paigns, or creatives separately. For example, given a campaign with 3 ads, an advertiser
could set FC(campaign) = 6, FC(ad1) = 2, FC(ad2) = 3, and FC(ad3) = 4 and these set-
tings would work together. The same user would at most see ad1 twice, ad2 three times,
ad3 four times, and all these ads displayed to him together would not exceed six times.
The frequency factor is normally set based on historical data and needs to be con-
stantly adjusted during the ﬂight time of the campaign, because different campaigns ask
for very different FCs as illustrated in Figure 5.12. The campaign 1 (left) received the
highest CVR with 6-10 impressions, which is also true for the cumulative CVR metrics.
However, the campaign 2 (right) received the highest CVR with 2-5 impressions. If the5.2. An Empirical Study of RTB Auctions 105
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Figure 5.12: The frequency against CVR from two different campaigns. Campaign 1 (left)
received the highest CVR with 6-10 impressions, which is also true for the cumu-
lative CVR metrics. However, campaign 2 (right) received the highest CVR with
2-5 impressions. If the campaign 1 sets a frequency cap of 2-5 impressions, most
of conversions would not be achieved. If the campaign 2 sets a frequency cap of
6-10, nearly half of impressions could be wasted.
campaign 1 sets a frequency cap of 2-5 impressions, most of the conversions will not
be achieved. If the campaign 2 sets a frequency cap of 6-10, nearly half of impressions
could be wasted. Therefore, a good FC setting is crucial to the efﬁciency of advertising.
Setting an optimal FC requires ﬁnding the right metrics to measure the efﬁciency
of different FCs. See the example in Table 5.1 where popular metrics are compared.
Assume there are 100 users; the CPM is ﬁxed at $10; the advertiser’s conversion goal
is worth $500. The table shows that using different metrics could lead to very different
decision. If the advertiser uses CVR as most of advertisers do, he would go for FC=3;
if the advertiser cares more about the total number of conversions, he would use FC=5
(seven conversions); if the advertiser cares more about CPA he would use FC=3, too; if
the advertiser measures the performance by ROI, he would go for FC=2.
Using FC = 2 seems the most proﬁtable. However, choosing FC = 3 is reason-
able, as well, especially when considering the long-term impact: FC = 3 gives more
conversions at low cost, and once these users are attracted they have a higher chance of
converting again in the future.
5.2.3.2 The Recency Factor
The recency factor (or recency cap, RC) helps to decide to bid or not, based on how
recently the ad was displayed to the same user. It also works at different levels includ-
ing campaign groups, campaigns, and creatives. For example, an advertiser can set5.2. An Empirical Study of RTB Auctions 106
Table 5.1: Thecomparisonofdifferentmetricsagainstfrequencycaps(FC).Notecvr andconvs
are fc speciﬁc, i.e. the extra value could be gained by increasing the frequency cap
from the previous level to the current one. The cumulative cvr is the CVR adver-
tisers use: total conversions divided by total impressions. The cpa gives the cost-
per-acquisition. The roi gives the return-on-investment based on the advertiser’s
conversion valuation. These values are calculated by assuming there are 100 users;
the CPM is ﬁxed at $10; the advertiser’s conversion goal is worth $500.
FC CVR (Cumulative) CVR Convs CPA ROI
1 0.0000 0.0000 0 - 0.00
2 0.0150 0.0150 3 667 1.50
3 0.0067 0.0167 2 600 1.25
4 0.0025 0.0150 1 667 1.00
5 0.0020 0.0140 1 714 0.88
6 0.0000 0.0117 0 857 0.70
7 0.0000 0.0100 0 1000 0.58
RC(campaign) = (1 hour) so that all ads from this campaign would be displayed to the
same user only once in every hour. Similar to the frequency factor, RCs are useful to
achieve the best advertising efﬁciency. For example, displaying ads intensively incurs
a high cost but little effect (or even getting people annoyed). Users need to think, com-
pare, and then make decisions. A better strategy is to display the same ad right after
the thinking time to remind users (e.g., ﬁnancial services). However, for some cam-
paigns (e.g., booking ﬂight tickets) users would convert very quickly or not convert at
all, which requires relatively intense advertising.
Figure 5.13 plots the RC against CVR of two different campaigns in the dataset.
BothcampaignsshowthehighestCVRatthe1-5minuteslevel. However, forcampaign
2 (below) the CVR is still not negligible after a long time (14-30 days). If the advertiser
uses a more strict RC setting (e.g., do not display ads to users who were ﬁrst exposed
14 days ago) he could lose potential conversions. On the other hand, using a loose RC
setting for campaign 1 (above) would only waste the advertising budget since the CVR
is very low after 14 days.
Another interesting observation is given in Figure 5.14. Similarly to the frequency
factor, the analysis of efﬁciency of RCs requires metrics based on the understanding of
advertising goal, which is not repeated here.5.3. The Reserve Price Problem and Solutions 107
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Figure 5.13: The recency factor against CVR from two different campaigns. Both campaigns
show the highest CVR at the 1-5 minutes level. However, for campaign 2 (below),
the CVR is still not negligible after a long time (14-30 days). If the advertiser uses
a more strict RC setting (e.g., do not display ads to users who were ﬁrst exposed
14 days ago) he could lose potential conversions. On the other hand, using a loose
RC setting for campaign 1 (above) will only waste budget since the CVR is very
low after 14 days.
The above analysis shows the importance of setting up proper FCs and RCs. At
present, the ﬁnest granularity of these settings is the creative level. With RTB, adver-
tisers can push them to a ﬁner granularity: setting FCs and RCs for individual users.
5.3 The Reserve Price Problem and Solutions
This section discusses the reserve price optimisation problem, proposes a solution, and
compare its performance with other baselines in real-world online experiments.
Suppose a publisher tries to maximise the ad revenue for a single placement (i.e.,
single-item). Impressions from this placement are sold using the second price auction
in RTB. The publisher could set a reserve price  before an auction is conducted.
To simplify the discussion, let us assume there is only one impression at each step
t and the publisher is optimising the revenue over horizon T. Let us also assume that
at each step t there are K  2 bidders participating in the auction. If there is only5.3. The Reserve Price Problem and Solutions 108
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Figure 5.14: The histogram of conversion window lengths since the ﬁrst exposure. Post-view
and post-click conversions are drawn separately but are from the same campaign.
The plot for the post-view conversions roughly distinguishes people into two
groups: impulse purchaser who converted quickly and rational purchaser who
took some time to think after seeing the ﬁrst ad. In order to maximise conversions,
the advertiser would consider setting up RCs to target these two types of users.
Interestingly the plot of post-click conversions suggests that the time needed to
ﬁll the form and complete the purchase varied a lot for different users (or they
could leave the page open for a while).
one bidder it is equivalent to having the second highest bid equals to the minimal bid
(usually $0.01). Note bidders could be different each time and could change quite a
lot—this introduces great noise into the system and challenges the estimation of the
distribution of the private evaluation values from the advertisers, where most auction
theories assume there is a ﬁx distribution of bids.
Foreachauction, letusdenotetheﬁnalbidsoftheplacementasb1(t);b2(t); ;bK(t).
Without loss of generality let us assume b1(t)  b2(t)    bK(t). Therefore, with-
out a reserve price ( = 0) the payoff could be denoted as r(t) = b2(t). Now suppose
the publisher sets a non-zero reserve price at each step, denoted by (t). The payoff5.3. The Reserve Price Problem and Solutions 109
function becomes:
r
0(t) =
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
(t); b1(t)  (t) > b2(t)
b2(t); b2(t)  (t)
0; (t) > b1(t)
(5.1)
The overall income is R(T) =
PT
t r0(t). It is assumed zero payoff when the re-
serve price is too high. In practice, publishers usually redirect these impressions to
managed campaigns or other ad marketplaces for re-selling. This reduces the risk of
over-optimisation. Comparing with the original payoff function, the case r0(t) = (t)
provides an extra gain, whereas the case r0(t) = 0 incurs a loss.
This section addresses the problem at the placement level; in other words, reserve
prices are adjusted periodically (instead for every impression). From a control theory’s
point of view, throughout the planning horizon the publisher wants to explore (learn)
the optimal  of the placement; the same time the publisher also exploits (predict) the
known best  to get as much payoff as possible and to compensate the loss.
5.3.1 Optimal Auction Theory
Bidders are encouraged to bid their private values in the second price auctions [36, 172]
whenareservepriceisabsent. Notethatthisdominantstrategydoesnotholdinmodern
sponsored search where quality scores are used [8] in ad ranking. Without quality
scores, the strategy of bidding at the private value forms part of the Nash equilibrium
of the system, meaning as time elapses advertisers have no incentive to change their
bids, given that all other factors remain the same. In this non-cooperative game [33],
the winner could, but would not, lower his bid to let other competitors win because
losing the auction is not beneﬁcial in either short-term or long-term (lowering the bid
while still winning has no effect since the winner always pays the second highest bid).
Suppose the publisher knows the bidders’ private value distribution. The optimal
auction theory mathematically deﬁnes the optimal reserve price [160, 173, 38, 36].
Here let us brieﬂy review the theory to make the paper self-contained [33]. Again
suppose there are K bidders, and they are risk-neutral and symmetric, i.e. having
identical value distributions. Each bidder k 2 K has private information on the value5.3. The Reserve Price Problem and Solutions 110
of an impression, drawn from distribution Fk(x), where Fk(x) denotes the probability
that the advertiser’s private evaluation value is less than or equal to a certain number x.
Usually it is assumed Log-normal [37] or Uniform distribution [36]. Assuming private
values are independently distributed, the distribution over value vector is
F() = F1()  FK();
and then the optimal reserve price is given as:
 =
1   F()
F 0()
+ vP; (5.2)
where F 0() is the density function, the ﬁrst order derivative of F() and vP is the
publisher’s private value. In practice, vP could be obtained from a guaranteed contract
with a ﬂat CPM, or from another ad network where the average revenue is known.
In the experiments this theory was implemented as OPTAUC and the Log-normal
distribution assumption of bidders’ private values was followed. The symmetric as-
sumption was also adopted, i.e., there was only one distribution for all bidders. Under
these assumptions, the optimality of the auction under GSP is proved in [154]. The es-
timation of Log-normal’s mean and standard deviation was obtained using the training
dataset (impression-level logs from 14 Dec 2012 to 18 Jan 2013).
5.3.1.1 Drawbacks in RTB Practice
In practice, there are drawbacks of the optimal auction theory mostly due to the dif-
ﬁculty of learning bidders’ private values, i.e., F(x). Firstly, a bidder could have a
complex private value distribution for impressions. In RTB, an advertiser computes a
bid for each impression based on the contextual [24] and behavioural [26] data. This
makes the bidding algorithms more based on a regression model than a simple para-
metric distribution. Besides, the bidding algorithms or regression models are never
disclosed to publishers or other advertisers. This is especially true and important in
RTB. On the contrary, in sponsored search, search engines run bidding algorithms for
advertisers and host auctions as a publisher at the same time. This allows full access
of information. Also, in sponsored search the auctions are based on keywords, so the
population of the bidders are relatively stable; whereas, in RTB, the auctions are at the
impression level and the advertisers are more ﬂexible in participation.5.3. The Reserve Price Problem and Solutions 111
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Figure 5.15: The histogram of 755 bidders’ lifetime across all placements. Each campaign is
considered a bidder in the study. The ﬁgure unveils three patterns: two created
by common ﬂight-time of campaigns (four weeks and six weeks) and one created
by exploration of learning algorithms (0-2 days). Due to limited time of data
collection there are some instances lying between 0-25 days because these bidders
started their activities before the start date of experiments.
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Figure 5.16: The change of winners for placements with different levels of competition in four
days. The fact that a bidder does not always win could add difﬁculty to reserve
price detection if undisclosed. The result also implies the change rate does not
necessary relate to the competition level.
The Uniform distribution assumption at placement level and Log-normal distribu-
tion at both placement and impression level were tested. Although these distributions
are widely adopted in research literature [36, 37], only a small portion of tests returned
positive results as shown in Figures 5.7 and 5.8.5.3. The Reserve Price Problem and Solutions 112
Secondly, it is assumed that advertisers bid at their private values in the second
price auction [160, 37]. However, in practice, an advertiser may not know his pri-
vate valuation of an impression. Instead, he often wants to achieve the best possible
performance. Also in different stages (learning, prospecting, retargeting, etc.) of an
advertising campaign, the bidding strategy may change. This makes the bidding activ-
ity vary considerably across the limited ﬂight time of a campaign. See a plot from the
experiments in Figure 5.15.
Thirdly, there are other practical constraints including accessibility of auction de-
tails, noise introduced by the frequent change of auction winners, c.f. Figure 5.16. I
believe these drawbacks lead to undesirable performance of an optimal auction theory
based algorithm in the real-world experiments.
5.3.2 A Simpliﬁed Dynamic Game
Toaddresstheabove-mentionedissue, thisthesistakesanalternativeviewandproposes
a simple auction game between the publisher and auction winners and identify the
dominant strategies. The game could be simpliﬁed by dropping the repeated nature
of auctions. Thus, the publisher only considers the current auction and do not learn
the private values from historical knowledge. In fact, the result of this simpliﬁcation
follows the instinct and is easy to implement as shown later; it also performs the best
in most of the cases in the online large scale real-world experiments.
First let us write down the extensive form representation of this dynamic game:
• Player: the winner of auctions (advertisers) w and the publisher p.
• The information set I before acting is the same for the winner and the publisher.
It has two decision nodes:
I1, the winning bid b is equal to or higher than the current reserve price ;
I2, the winning bid is lower than the reserve price.
• The action set of the winner Aw:
aw1, to increase b to higher than ;
aw2, to increase b to lower than ;
aw3, to decrease or hold b to higher than ;
aw4, to decrease or hold b to lower than .
• The action set of the publisher Ap:5.3. The Reserve Price Problem and Solutions 113
ap1, to increase or hold  to higher than b;
ap2, to increase or hold  to lower than b;
ap3, to decrease  to higher than b;
ap4, to decrease  to lower than b.
• The sequence of move: ﬁrst the publisher, then the winner.
The game tree representation, as well as the payoff function, is given in Fig-
ure 5.17. Note for some nodes the payoff of the winner consists two numbers, e.g.,
30= 10, when the winner chooses to increase the bid, i.e., the action aw1. The positive
value stands for the case where it is still proﬁtable to raise the bid, while the negative
value stands for the possible loss if raising the bid, since the advertiser has reached the
maximum affordable price (i.e., the revenue of sales through the ad). In the latter case,
an advertiser would choose other actions like aw2 or aw4. These values have been care-
fully selected to reﬂect the positions of bidder. For example, I1 ! I1jap2 ! I1jaw1
would give less payoff to the advertiser than I1 ! I2jap1 ! I1jaw1 because he has
been increasing bids to win auctions.
When deducing dominant strategies it is assumed that both cases happen with an
equal chance since both publishers and advertisers do not use historical knowledge but
only the last state. Therefore, payoff of the publisher in these cases is discounted by
0:5 since a rational advertiser would not choose a negative payoff.
5.3.2.1 The Publisher’s Dominant Strategy
This section analyses the case where the publisher and the winner play the game for
only one round. The dominant strategy for the publisher is:
s

p(I) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
ap2; if I = I1
ap4; if I = I2
(5.3)
which gives the expected payoff:
R(s

pjI) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
60 if I = I1
40 if I = I2
(5.4)5.3. The Reserve Price Problem and Solutions 114
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Figure 5.17: The game between the winner and the publisher in the reserve price problem.
The publisher moves ﬁrst, then the winner. Players are not drawn. Numbers are
chosencarefullytoreﬂectthepositionsofplayersratherthantheabsoluterevenue.
fI1;I2g represent the information set. For the ﬁrst round when the publisher has
to start randomly, or set a reserve price to his private valuation of the impression.
The leaf nodes give the result information set as well as the payoffs of (winner,
publisher). Note for the action aw1 the payoff of the winner could be negative if
he has already been bidding the maximal affordable price. This model assumes
these cases happen at a chance of 50% due to no utilisation of historical data.
Thus, the payoff of the publisher is discounted by 0:5 in these cases.
The proof is eliminated here since it could be easily acquired by following nodes
iteratively in the game tree, c.f. Figure 5.17. This strategy will serve as the foundation
of the ONESHOT algorithm proposed in the following section. On the other hand, the
dominant strategy for the winner (advertiser) is
s

w(I) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
aw3; if I = I1
aw1; if I = I2
(5.5)
which indicates that the bid price should be gradually reduced but increased again when
lost the auction.
In sum, these strategies indicate the publisher should keep the reserve price below
the winning bid while trying to approach the winning bid gradually. If the reserve price
is too high, it should be reduced drastically to make sure it will be below the winning5.3. The Reserve Price Problem and Solutions 115
Table 5.2: The payoff matrix of the publisher if the new winner bid randomly. I1 and I2 denote
the starting information set. ap stands for publishers’ actions. The publisher’s
dominant strategy remains the same and is illustrated in bold font.
I1 I2
ap1 1/3 * 70 1/3 * 70
ap2 1/3 * 80 + 1/3 * 60 -
ap3 - 1/3 * 60
ap4 1/3 * 70 + 1/3 * 40 1/3 * 50 + 1/3 * 40
bid. Following these actions, the ﬁnal state of the system comes to the second price
auction without a reserve price, i.e., the reserve price is always equal to the second
highest bid. In this state, the publisher does not need to lower  anymore. The winner
will not lower the bid otherwise he would lose the auction that gives a zero payoff.
However, this state has never been observed in experiments due to the frequent change
of bidders, variation of bids, possibly different strategies adopted by advertisers (e.g.
always bid at the private value).
5.3.2.2 Introducing the Randomness
One may argue that since winners of auctions are constantly changing this is no longer
a game between two players, but between a player and a group. The frequency of
changing is indeed high, c.f. Figure 5.16. However, since the knowledge of auctions
is not shared among the bidder group, each player of this group only possesses an
imperfect information set. This could result in the randomness of winner’s actions:
the new winner does not have the outcome of the last auction, so has to bid randomly,
which is usually based on private valuation of the impression or simply instinct.
In this case, the dominant strategy of the publisher is still the one deﬁned in Equa-
tion 5.3. This case removes the negative payoffs of the winner from the game tree in
Figure 5.17 and allows him to bid randomly regardless of what action has been chosen
by the publisher. The negative payoffs are removed because the new winner should not
bid above his private valuation of the impression in the ﬁrst-time step. The single-step
payoff matrix of the publisher is shown in Table 5.2.
By playing this auction game with advertisers’ random actions the publisher has5.3. The Reserve Price Problem and Solutions 116
the payoff:
R
0(s

pjI) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1
3  80 + 1
3  60; if I = I1
1
3  50 + 1
3  40; if I = I2
(5.6)
This case describes the real-world marketplace more closely. In fact, the conver-
gence to the second price auction state hardly happens due to two reasons. Firstly, the
winner of auctions changes constantly as illustrated in Figure 5.16, especially when
there are many bidders in auctions. Secondly, the detection of the reserve price could
be difﬁcult (when it is not disclosed) and costly. It becomes even harder if certain ran-
domisation is introduced to the ﬁnal reserve price setting. The winner could suffer from
distinguishing a reserve price from his competitors’ bids. From the bidder’s perspec-
tive, the dominant strategy of competing with other bidders (bidding the private value)
and with the publisher (keep lowering the bid before losing) is clearly different.
5.3.2.3 The OneShot Algorithm
This section designs an algorithm based on the dominant strategy analysis above. For
the publisher, if the winning bid is higher than the reserve price, slowly increase the
reserve price; otherwise, decrease drastically. The actual implementation is slightly
different that it introduces parameters to control the magnitude of the change under
different situations. The equations are
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
(t + 1) = (1   th)a(t) if (t) > b1(t)
(t + 1) = (1 + te)a(t) if b1(t)  (t)  b2(t)
(t + 1) = (1 + tl)(t) if b2(t) > (t)
where  2 (0;1] and h;e;l 2 [0;1].  is a decay factor w.r.t. time, allowing the re-
serve price to converge if needed. h controls the cooling speed when the reserve price
is too high; e controls the continued exploration when the reserve price is successful;
l controls the heating up speed when the reserve price is too low.
Note the values of these parameters depend on targeting combinations (place-5.3. The Reserve Price Problem and Solutions 117
ments, date and time, geography, etc.). They need to be tuned to achieve the best result.
For example, in the experiments an effective setting of these parameters was  = 1:0,
h = 0:3, e = 0:01, and l = 0:02 for placement 834119 and hour-of-day=8. These
parameters were obtained using the training dataset (impression-level logs from 14 Dec
2012 to 18 Jan 2013). This algorithm is denoted as ONESHOT in the experiments.
5.3.3 Other Private Value Based Algorithms
Although not optimal in theory, there are other algorithms that make use of private
value distributions. Here two simple methods based on Bayes’ rules are described. An
advantage of such algorithms is that they could be easily tuned to be more aggressive
or less according to the greediness (or risk preference) of the publisher. A disadvantage
is that it does not take the future into account, so only the current payoff is maximised.
5.3.3.1 Bivariate Log-normal Distribution
To make the algorithm easier to understand let us keep the Log-normal distribution
assumption of private values. A different distribution changes the formulae but the idea
and derivation still hold. Here, the ﬁrst and second highest bids are captured using a
bivariate Log-normal distribution:
2
6 6 6
4
B1
B2
3
7 7 7
5
 lognorm(;) (5.7)
where  and  stand for mean and variance respectively. For simplicity let us consider
 known and use a bivariate Gaussian distribution as the conjugate prior for :
(t)  N((t);(t))
The priori could be learned using historical data. In the experiments, impression
logs from 14 Dec 2012 to 18 Jan 2013 were used. During evaluation, each time the
publisher observes the highest and 2nd highest bids in an auction, then updates the5.3. The Reserve Price Problem and Solutions 118
belief using Bayesian inference:
2
6 6 6
4
B1
B2
3
7 7 7
5
jb(t)  lognorm((t + 1);(t + 1) + )
where
(t + 1) = (
 1(t) + 
 1)
 1(
 1(t)(t) + b(t))
(t + 1) = (
 1(t) + 
 1)
 1
Then with p(B1;B2) estimated at current time t, a reserve price which has the
maximum probability of sitting between the two bids can be solved:
(t)
 = argmax
(t)
P(B1  (t)  B2) (5.8)
where (t) is the current reserve price and
B1
B2    1 is the risk preference param-
eter. It pushes the result closer to the winning bids. In the experiments it was  = 1 to
mimic a risk-averse choice.
The maximum could be achieved by letting the ﬁrst derivative equal zero. A
numerical solution was used and the result was approximated in the algorithm’s im-
plementation using the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) method, the most
popularoneinQuasi-Newtonmethodsclass. TheBFGSmethodusestheﬁrstderivative
and has proven good performance for smooth optimizations [174] and. This algorithm
is denoted as BAYESIANB in experiments.
5.3.3.2 Univariate Log-normal Distribution
The most greedy choice from Equation 5.8 is to let  =
B1
B2: regardless of the second
highestbidder, thepublishercouldalwayslearnandapproachthehighestbiddirectly. It
is equivalent to modelling the winning bids using a univariate Log-normal distribution,
which has a simpler solution
B1  lognorm(;
2)
(t)  N((t);
2(t))5.3. The Reserve Price Problem and Solutions 119
and still it is assumed that 2 is known. Every time an observation on the highest bid
b1 gives
(t + 1) =
(t)2(t) + 2b1
2 + 2(t)

2(t + 1) =
2(t)2
2 + 2(t)
where the priori was obtained using the training dataset.
Then the publisher simply chooses
a(t + 1) = log((t + 1)) + (
2 + 
2(t + 1)) (5.9)
as the new reserve price where  is the risk preference for this model which could be
either positive or negative. In the experiments it was  = 0 for simplicity.
This algorithm is denoted as BAYESIANU. Again, the ﬁtting of private value dis-
tribution is beyond the scope of this paper but the ideas and algorithms always hold,
allowing different models to be implemented easily (it is highly likely that different
models would be used for different placements, hour-of-day, and etc.).
5.3.4 Private Value Free Algorithms
There are algorithms based on conventional wisdom or business intuition. They do not
assume that each advertiser has their own private valuation of the impression. In fact,
they play a signiﬁcant role in reserve price setup in the real-world. This section presents
two simple methods as baselines among many choices.
The most essential one is the FIXED algorithm which sets a static reserve price for
all time steps, regardless of the outcome of auctions. Formally, it is (t)  a where a
denotes the pre-chosen ﬁxed reserve price.
When  = 0 it becomes ZERO which totally relies on the auction mechanism,
here second price auction, assuming that quality score (or similar factors like bid bias)
is absent. It is apparently the most altruistic one in the strategy space which does not try
to gain any extra beneﬁt and could be used as a baseline to measure bidders’ attrition.
The FIXED (including ZERO) is the most straightforward and easy to implement.
Besides, it directly reﬂects the publisher’s private valuation of the inventory. Before
they adopt the automated selling, publishers are used to negotiating contracts with ad-5.4. Online Test Results and Discussions 120
vertisers or their representatives. The contract price could be easily converted to a
reserve price. Also, due to the simplicity this is probably the most widely adopted al-
gorithm in today’s ad marketplaces. In the experiments, FIXED and ZERO were used as
the most naive baselines. However, although simple, under certain circumstances they
performed surprisingly well.
Another family of private-value-free algorithms is based on historical payoff of
auctions. For example, the AVERAGE sets the reserve price to the average of past
payoff. Formally it is
(t) =
1
M
t 1 X
i=t M
r(i) (5.10)
where r(t) is the payoff at time step t and M is the averaging window.
A natural extension is the weighted average variation, which values more of recent
payoff. Formally, it is
(t) =
1
M
t 1 X
i=t M
w(i;t)r(i) (5.11)
where w() is the weighting function, which could take various forms. In the experi-
ments, linear weights were used and the algorithms is denoted WEIGHTEDL.
AVERAGE and WEIGHTEDL share the similar insights with FIXED, except recog-
nizing the ﬂuctuation of demand and supply in the market. This ﬂuctuation may affect
the reserve price setting especially at hour-of-day level.
5.4 Online Test Results and Discussions
The online experiments were carried out in the same production platform as the empiri-
cal study. The experiments include 25 placements as the treatment group and additional
eight as the control group. For each placement, RTB auction logs were collected which
record bidders and their bids in every auction. The live experiments ran from 19th Jan
to 21st Feb 2013. The parameters of algorithms were trained using logs from 14th Dec
2012 to 18th Jan 2013.5.4. Online Test Results and Discussions 121
5.4.1 Algorithms and Scheduling
The following algorithms and conﬁgurations were evaluated.
• FIXED, with publisher value set to $1.0;
• ZERO, with a ﬁxed reserve price set to $0.0;
• AVERAGE;
• WEIGHTEDL, with a looking-back-window-size of ﬁve;
• ONESHOT, with  = 1 and h;m, and l learned individually for each place-
ment;
• BAYESIANB, with , , and  learned individually for each placement;
• BAYESIANU, with ;, and  learned individually for each placement.
Note that the private value of $1.0 was based on the publisher’s suggestion.
Algorithms were evaluated as the following: impression-level logs were continu-
ously sampled then fed to algorithms. The experiments used a Round Robin scheduler
at the hour level. For example, at Hour=1 and Day=1 Algorithm=OPTAUC was used on
Placement=1, Algorithm=ZERO was used on Placement=2, etc.; on Hour=2 and Day=1
Algorithm=BAYESIANU was used on Placement=1, Algorithm=OPTAUC was used on
Placement=2, etc. This scheduling ensures that the day-of-week factor does not in-
ﬂuence the evaluation of performance of algorithms. In this way every (hour-of-day,
algorithm, level of competition) tuple generated ten sets of observations. The results
were split into six non-overlapping chunks and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test [175]
was used to check the signiﬁcance.
5.4.2 Results
This section reports the performance of algorithms with respect to levels of competition
in Figure 5.18. In sum, the private-value-free algorithms performed better than private-
value-based ones. Considering the percentage of placements of high, medium, low
level of competition, the ONESHOT performed signiﬁcantly better in about 70% cases.
This is very consistent with the ﬁndings made in [37].
Looking at the results and analysis made before, there is a good reason to believe
that the undesirable ﬁtting of Log-normal distribution led to the poor performance of
private-value-based algorithms on placements with many bidders. Although there is
a steady hourly average winning bids pattern on these placements, there are also lots5.4. Online Test Results and Discussions 122
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Figure 5.18: A snapshot of main results of the online experiments, on all placements, from
6am to 10am across all days. The  indicates the OneShot performed signiﬁcantly
better than others (except the WeightedL) using Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Con-
sidering the percentage of placements of high, medium, low level of competition,
the OneShot performed signiﬁcantly better in about 70% cases. On placements
having fewer bidders, it is hard to distinguish the results. Although not reported,
at other hours the results are similar.
Table 5.3: The change of number of bidders after the experiments. On most of placements,
especially ones with high level of competition, the increment is observed
 -10% -5%  -10% 5%  10%  10%
High 3 0 0 3
Medium 4 2 4 6
Low 3 0 0 8
Control 1 0 0 5
of short periods of burst (both upward and downward) around the curve as shown in
Figure 5.9, which could have dragged the models away from the curve easily. On the
contrary, the private-value-free algorithms had a better chance of capturing these bursts.
The ONESHOT shares the same intuition as the WEIGHTEDL: using the obser-
vations of the recent future to infer the reserve price. More speciﬁcally, the auction
logs were replayed in training dataset against various parameter sets and adopted the
best-performing one.5.4. Online Test Results and Discussions 123
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Figure 5.19: The comparison of winning bids and number of bidders across all placements
before and after the experiments. Both factors increased after the experiment,
which contradicts the attrition hypothesis that bidders would reduce their bid or
volume after reserve price optimisation.
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Figure 5.20: Bidders’ attrition test after the optimisation, comparing with the number of bid-
ders before the experiments. The t-test suggests the attrition was signiﬁcant on
seven placements. Three are placements of low level of competition and four of
medium level. However, many more placements see an increment of the number
of buyers after the experiments, c.f. Table 5.3.
5.4.3 Bidders’ Attrition
As argued before, a key difference of reserve price optimisation in RTB is that the in-
ventory is much less limited than ordinary auctions or sponsored search. Thus, it is
important to study whether the reserve price optimisation could result in bidders’ attri-
tion [33] in a long term (e.g., reduce their bid values or volume). Figure 5.19 compares
winning bids and number of bidders before and after the reserve price optimisation5.5. Conclusions 124
experiments. The result suggests the insigniﬁcant attrition.
To test the statistical signiﬁcance of the change, the mean and standard deviation
of the number of bidders were taken for each placement before (12-18 Jan 2013) and
after(15-21Feb2013)theoptimisationexperiments. Thenullhypothesisofthebuyers’
attrition could be denoted as H0: 1   2 > 0 where N1(1;1) and N2(2;2) are
the Normal distribution ﬁtted from number of bidders before and after the experiments
respectively. Its rejection implies insigniﬁcance of bidders’ attrition.
The result of t-test with p-value 0.05 is summarised in Figure 5.20. There are only
seven placements out of 39 showed a signiﬁcant drop of the number of bidders after the
experiments. 3 of them are placements of low level of competition and 4 of medium
level, where a slight change of would be signiﬁcant. Interestingly, Table 5.3 unveils
a opposite pattern: the publisher was seeing more bidders on most of the placements.
This could be due to three reasons: 1) during holidays (the beginning of the experi-
ments), there were fewer bidders because of a reduced amount of Internet trafﬁc; 2)
bidders were not aware of the reserve price optimisation, so no reaction is taken; 3) the
campaigns’ lifetime introduces ﬂuctuation.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter discusses a speciﬁc problem for publisher revenue optimisation in Real-
Time Bidding: to ﬁnd the optimal reserve price for single-item display ad auctions. It
is a problem of signiﬁcant importance, which has been studied extensively in the game
theory, but is relatively new in online advertising research literature, especially in RTB
that has many unique features. This chapter analyses drawbacks of the optimal auction
theory in the RTB practice, derives dominant strategies from the one-shot version of the
auction game, and compares it with other commonly adopted algorithms in online ex-
periments in a production platform. The challenges of optimising reserve prices in RTB
are also discussed and bidders’ attrition in the experiments was analysed. Due to the
complexity of the problem and practical constraints there are unsolved issues, includ-
ing the ﬁtting of bids, parameters tuning, and more comprehensive attrition analysis.
These are left to the feature works.
To carry out the online experiments a software system was developed to perform
scheduled data feeds collection, parsing, cleaning, and saving to a database, computing5.5. Conclusions 125
reserve prices using pre-deﬁned algorithms, and applying the result via API services.
To make this complex process easier to follow, with the support from UCL Advances,
I describe the design and implementation of the system in Appendix B.Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Works
Overall, the thesis has proposed an optimisation framework for the supply side. The
main objective of optimisations is to achieve the maximum revenue in the long term
(usually constrained by a ﬁnite planning horizon). This thesis studies the online dis-
play advertising ecosystem including its history and structure (Figure 1.1), processes
in Real-Time Bidding (RTB, Figure 1.2), and the cash ﬂow (Figure 1.3). Following
the life cycle of ad-supported websites managed by publishers (the supply side), sev-
eral optimisation problems have been investigated including ad density optimisation,
ad source selection, and reserve price optimisation. For each problem, proposed inno-
vative models and algorithms have been proposed which then have been evaluated in
large-scale experiments.
To solve the ad density optimisation problem, a game theoretic optimal control
model has been built which considers the competition of similar publishers. Compar-
ing with the case without competition (social welfare maximisation) shows the com-
petition leads to global sub-optimal solution, which results in Internet users suffering
from seeing more ads. This ﬁnding aligns well with the tragedy of the commons theory
in economics. Besides, the empirical study has shown the general increasing trend of
online display ads on the Internet, as well as the correlation of ad density with many
other factors.
To solve the ad channel selection problem, a Partially Observable Markov De-
cision Process (POMDP) model has been proposed which uses correlation of candi-
dates to accelerate exploration. This thesis has presented both the exact solution using
value iteration and approximation using a multi-armed bandit model. Also, the thesis
includes a toy example to showcase the calculation process and importance of explo-127
ration. Comparing with other popular algorithms on a real-world dataset shows the
advantage of proposed algorithms that are mainly contributed by the correlated belief
update. These have been published as [114] and [176].
To solve the reserve price optimisation problem, heuristics derived from a simpli-
ﬁed game model have been proposed. The model considers the competition between
the buyer and the seller to be one-shot instead of repeated. In this way, the model
avoids the private value distribution ﬁtting hurdle which virtually results in the poor
performance of optimal auction theory in RTB. The large scale online experiments
have validated the better performance of the proposed model, too. These have been
published as [177] and [47].
To make the thesis easier to understand, a list of terminologies has been included
in Appendix A. Also, the implementation details of the reserve price optimisation pro-
totype system have been included in Appendix B, hoping to bridge the gap between our
research and the industry.
During the development of the thesis, a lot of interesting ideas and issues have
emerged. However, due to limited time and resources, only a few of them have been
discussed. Here I summarise the possible directions of the future works:
• To combine the ad density control with the reserve price optimisation; to use the
users’ satisfactory as the lower bound of the reserve price. I.e., reject the bid if it
cannot compensate for the loss of users’ satisfactory in the long term;
• To investigate a wider range of probabilistic distributions for bids in RTB auc-
tions, and their impact on the reserve price optimisation;
• To integrate the attrition metrics into the reserve price optimisation algorithms.
I.e., do not set the reserve price too high (even if auctions still hold) if it drives
away buyers in the long term;
• To study the statistical arbitrage among possible ad sources. I.e., bidding for an
impression in one ad source and selling it immediately in another;
• To use users’ segments as key features of selling impressions, especially for set-
ting reserve prices;128
• To develop algorithms of packaging impressions into guaranteed or non-
guaranteed deals, and optimise the allocation of selling in advance and selling in
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Terminology and Explanation
This appendix summarises the terms and concepts used frequently in online advertising
industry.
Ad Exchange: A marketplace where demand and supply from various sources are ag-
gregated and traded [178], like a multi-level marketing structure [179] (i.e., they
aggregate demand and supply of ad networks, and also connect with advertisers
and publishers directly).
Ad Network: A marketplace for advertisers to buy impressions and for publishers to
sell them. Usually ad networks connects with advertisers and publishers directly.
Since they are usually limited by certain rules (geographical location, content
vertical, etc.) on the commercial side, the demand and supply in a single ad
network are usually unbalanced.
Bid Phrase: A keyword or key-phrase that advertisers bid on to represent their antici-
pation of the user intention, mostly used in sponsored search [8].
Click-Through Rate (CTR): A click-through occurs when a user clicks on an ad. The
CTR is the number of clicks divided by the number of impressions [180].
Conversion Rate (CVR): A conversion occurs when a user completes some action
(e.g., downloading, registering, or purchasing) after reading an ad. The con-
version rate is usually calculated as the number of conversions divided by the
number of impressions [180]. There are also cases where it is deﬁned as the
number of conversions divided by the number of clicks [181].
Cookie: A small ﬁle placed on the users computer by a website that is usually for
saving personal information and could be used by advertisers for targeting [90].
Cost per Action (CPA): The price that an advertiser pays if a user converts (e.g., down-149
loading, registering, or purchasing).
Cost per Click (CPC): The price that an advertiser pays if the ad is clicked.
Cost per Mille-impressions (CPM): The price that the advertiser would pay if his ad is
displayed one thousand times. Since a single impression is usually very cheap
(about $0.001 to $0.01), one thousand is used for the ease of presentation.
Creative: A brief description, in the form of text, picture, animation, or video, about a
service or product that the advertiser wishes to promote. It is the actual content
of an ad.
Data Management Platform (DMP): A system that collects, builds, and sells users’ in-
terest segment information. With the help of such information better matching
could be achieved especially in Real-Time Bidding [182].
Demand Side Platform (DSP): An automated bidding platform for advertisers to buy
impressions across ad exchanges.
Impression: An opportunity of displaying an ad to a user reading the webpage.
Inventory: Virtual assets owned by a publisher. It usually refers to a group of impres-
sions from certain placements.
Landing Page: A webpage associated with an ad. The user will be redirected to this
webpage after clicking the ad.
Organic Search Result: Search results that are returned by normal search algorithms
with no advertising involved.
Personally Identiﬁable Information (PII): Information about a user that can be deter-
mined from their cookies, browser information, and other sources [183].
Placement (Ad slot): A section on a webpage (or multiple webpages, or even across
websites) that displays ads.
Return-On-Investment (ROI): Usually expressed as a percentage, ROI is the ratio of
money gained or lost (whether realized or unrealized) on an investment relative
to the amount of money invested [184].
Real-Time Bidding (RTB): An ad trading mechanism in which an advertiser will be
asked to submit a response for every bid request. RTB was introduced by ad
exchanges where it is impossible to know all advertisers or publishers in advance.
Second Price Auction (Vickery Auction): The winner pays the next highest bid instead
of his own bid [185].150
Segment (Tag): A category that a user belongs to. In online advertising segments could
be very ﬂexible, for example by income range, ages of children, hobbies, psy-
chometry, and short-term purchase intent. Usually segments are not explicitly
stated but inferred by users’ Internet usage.
Supply Side Platform (SSP): Anautomatedplatformforpublisherstomanageinvento-
ries and sell impressions in many ad exchanges. An essential advantage of using
a SSP is to reach more potential buyers. Besides, such a platform is expected to
optimise the revenue by applying various yield management tools.
User: A person who browsers the web and reads ads.Appendix B
Implementing a Reserve Price
Optimisation System
The chapter describes in detail the implementation of reserve price optimisation pro-
totype system. The source code could be obtained from https://github.com/
shuaiyuancn/rtb-reserve-price-opt. The system has been designed and
implemented mainly in the AppNexus’ advertising ecosystem. Thus, it follows certain
standard and data formats, and requires account and privileges before use. However,
the system can be easily modiﬁed to work with other Supply Side Platforms (SSP) as
long as the general input (auction data feed or performance report) and output (API to
manipulate the reserve prices) functions are available.
In a production environment, the cost of implementing such a system depends on
several factors:
The number of optimisation tasks. Apparently, each task takes certain amount
of time to complete (loading conﬁguration, pulling data, running algorithms, apply-
ing result, logging, etc.). The number of tasks has a linear relationship to the cost or
system’s capacity.
The granularity of optimisation. If an ad placement has huge number of im-
pressions, it is preferable to cluster impressions according to targeting rules that matter
the most (e.g., hours of day, geographical locations, ad sizes, user segments). Every
dimension adds extra sophistication to the optimisation process. The number of clus-
tering dimensions has a polynomial relationship to the cost or the system’s capacity.
The optimisation algorithms. In the prototype system there is a brute force al-
gorithm that does the exhaustive search of the optimal reserve price value over the pastB.1. Market Research 152
data feed. Although the algorithm itself has been optimised when implemented (by
using brute function in scipy.optimize package1 with reasonable number of it-
erations), it could take a long time to ﬁnish if the range of exploration is wide, e.g.,
from $0.0 to $10.0 with a step of $0.01. Similarly, other algorithms with high compu-
tational complexity could easily add running time of each optimisation iteration, thus
adding the cost.
In the experiments of Chapter 5, the prototype system has been set up in Amazon
EC22 using an m3.large instance. Such an instance has has 2 virtual CPUs (each of
that is equivalent to an Intel Xeon E5-2670 v2 (Ivy Bridge) processor), 7.5 Gigabyte
memory, and 32 Gigabyte solid state drive (SSD) instance storage. To save the large
scale of auction data feeds, two 1.0 Terabyte Amazon Elastic Block Stores (EBS)3 have
been used to form a RAID0 structure4.
Such an instance has been created in the Europe region in Amazon EC2 with a
3-year reserved instance contract. The instance serves the hourly optimisation of more
than 30 tasks. The effective monthly cost is less than $240.
B.1 Market Research
Before presenting the prototype system, this section surveys the current online adver-
tising ecosystem for similar products or services, although details of such products or
services are usually undisclosed to non-clients. The intention is to review the feasibil-
ity (most SSPs provide the reserve price setting) and relatively low competition (few
companies offer the dynamic reserve price optimisation).
More commonly, SSPs provide the capability of setting up a reserve price (some-
times also a soft ﬂoor price) in their platform. Such function could usually be access
via API provided by the vendor. For example,
• Doubleclick For Publisher (DFP)
• AppNexus Console
• OpenX SSP
• MoPub
1http://goo.gl/f8VZ6A (Last accessed: 4/8/2014)
2http://aws.amazon.com/ec2 (Last accessed: 4/8/2014)
3http://aws.amazon.com/ebs (Last accessed: 4/8/2014)
4http://goo.gl/I8ZJ4Q (Last accessed: 4/8/2014)B.1. Market Research 153
The existence of rich APIs and few products or services suggest good opportunity
of dynamic reserve price optimisation in online advertising marketplace. However, few
of them provide such a function in their systems.
The only exception is Rubicon Project (NYSE: RUBI), founded in 2007, an on-
line advertising technology ﬁrm based in Los Angeles, California. In February 2014,
the company ﬁled for an IPO and went public in April of 2014 opening at over $20
per share. The stock fell back to about $16 per share later in the month. In March
of 2014, the company was named number two on the top Ad Exchange Entities by
comScore [186].
The company optimises advertising revenue for web sites with the product Seller
Cloud, by using thousands of proprietary and proven data-driven, machine-learning
algorithms that replace guesswork. For the reserve price optimisation, the company
offers to clients Dynamic Price Floors which is essentially a brute force approach. The
algorithm is described as5:
One form of that analysis is auction simulation. Using a Hadoop cluster
and proprietary algorithms the REVV platform simulates the auction at
differentpriceﬂoors, usuallyatpennyincrementsbetweenﬁvecentsand20
dollars. During the simulation the system records the revenue gained for
each impression whether it goes to the highest bidder at the second price,
at the ﬂoor price or even if the ﬂoor prices out all bids and the impression
goes to a non-RTB demand source. After the simulation another algorithm
runs through the revenue at each ﬂoor and determines at which ﬂoor price
the revenue is maximized. These simulations are run at different levels of
audience granularity and the resulting, boiled data is stored.
Note that REVV is the former name of the Seller Cloud.
As argued in Chapter 5, buyers’ attrition analysis could be crucial because any
reserve price takes the risk of driving advertisers away. This is especially important
with quick advancement of bidding algorithms in recent years, since more and more
of them are taking into account the cost when making bidding decisions. In REVV or
Seller Cloud such analysis module cannot be identiﬁed.
5http://goo.gl/tMrb92 (Last accessed: 7/8/2014)B.2. Prerequisites 154
There are other companies providing reserve price optimisation products or ser-
vices, For example,
• MediaFuse, details are undisclosed;
• PubSquared, details are undisclosed;
• AlephD, details are undisclosed;
• adomik, the dynamic ﬂoor prices are set at placement or publisher level. A case
study on Orange Ad Market [187] showed 22% monthly revenue increase on
average;
Comparing with many large media groups relying more and more heavily on on-
line advertising revenue, the relatively few optimisation providers suggest a good op-
portunity in the market.
B.2 Prerequisites
This section lists the prerequisites. The prototype system is implemented in Python
2.7.8 that could be obtained from https://www.python.org. However, it is
strongly recommended using Anaconda distribution which could be obtained from
https://store.continuum.io/cshop/anaconda. The major advantage of
it, especiallyonaWindows/PCplatform, istosavealotofeffortsettingupthescientiﬁc
computing environment, because the distribution comes with many useful libraries.
If one prefers to set up the environment with greater control, note that the follow-
ing Python libraries are used by the prototype:
Numpy, obtained from http://numpy.scipy.org with version 1.8.1.
NumPy is the fundamental package for scientiﬁc computing in Python. It is a Python
library that provides a multidimensional array object, various derived objects (such
as masked arrays and matrices), and an assortment of routines for fast operations on
arrays, including mathematical, logical, shape manipulation, sorting, selecting, I/O,
discrete Fourier transforms, basic linear algebra, basic statistical operations, random
simulation and much more. In the prototype system, Numpy is widely used for random
choices, series generation, applying computation to an array, etc.
pandas, obtained from http://pandas.pydata.org with version 0.14.1.
pandas is a Python package providing fast, ﬂexible, and expressive data structures de-
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to be the fundamental high-level building block for doing practical, real world data
analysis in Python. Additionally, it has the broader goal of becoming the most power-
ful and ﬂexible open source data analysis/manipulation tool available in any language.
In the prototype system, pandas is widely used to manage data efﬁciently, e.g., indexing
and re-indexing, ﬁltering, transforming, and some quick plotting.
SciPy, obtained from http://www.scipy.org with version 0.14.0. SciPy is
a collection of mathematical algorithms and convenience functions built on the Numpy
extension of Python. It adds signiﬁcant power to the interactive Python session by pro-
viding the user with high-level commands and classes for manipulating and visualizing
data. With SciPy an interactive Python session becomes a data-processing and system-
prototyping environment. In the prototype system, optimize package in SciPy is
used to solve convex function optimisation and exhaustive search problems.
scikit-learn, obtained from http://scikit-learn.org with version
0.15.1. scikit-learn is a simple and efﬁcient tools for data mining and data analy-
sis. It is made accessible to everybody, and reusable in various contexts. It has been
built on NumPy, SciPy, and matplotlib. In the prototype system, generalised linear
model packages from scikit-learn are used to solve regression tasks.
Requests, obtained from http://www.python-requests.org with ver-
sion 2.3.0. Requests takes all of the work out of Python HTTP/1.1 making your in-
tegration with web services seamless. Theres no need to manually add query strings
to your URLs, or to form-encode your POST data. Keep-alive and HTTP connection
pooling are 100% automatic, powered by urllib3, which is embedded within Requests.
In the prototype system, Requests is used to communicate with remote API services to
manipulate reserve prices.
matplotlib, obtained from http://www.matplotlib.org with version
1.3.1. matplotlib is a library for making 2D plots of arrays in Python. Although it
has its origins in emulating the MATLAB6 graphics commands, it is independent of
MATLAB, and can be used in a Pythonic, object oriented way. Although matplotlib
is written primarily in pure Python, it makes heavy use of NumPy and other exten-
sion code to provide good performance even for large arrays. In the prototype system,
matplotlib is used to generate analytical charts to monitor performance and attrition.
6MATLAB is a registered trademark of The MathWorks, Inc.B.3. Overview of the prototype 156
web.py, obtained from http://webpy.org with version 0.3. web.py is a very
clean and simple web framework/library written in Python to assist in the development
of Python web applications. Where other frameworks may offer more features and
complexity, web.py excels in keeping things simple and efﬁcient. In the prototype
system, web.py is used to power a simple web UI for optimisation task management.
We also use its db package to access the MySQL database.
MySQL-Python, or MySQLdb, obtained from http://mysql-python.
sourceforge.net with version 1.2.2. MySQLdb is an thread-compatible inter-
face to the popular MySQL database server that provides the Python database API. In
the prototype system it is used by web.py to access the MySQL database.
Additionally, the prototype system uses crontab in Linux systems to schedule job
running. The back-end database system is MySQL, which could be obtained from
http://www.mysql.com.
B.3 Overview of the prototype
This section describes modules of the prototype system and their functionalities; then
the ﬂow of data and their structure (ﬁelds) to provide an overview of the system.
B.3.1 Modules
The prototype system consists of the following modules:
Taskcontroller, alsotheentrypointofthesystem, isresponsibleforrunningload-
ing conﬁguration from database for each task, pulling data feeds (mainly auction data),
running assigned algorithm, accessing remote API services to apply reserve prices, and
logging major activities for future analysis.
API services controller provides necessary functions for accessing remote API
services, including authentication, pulling data feeds, downloading reports, and apply-
ing reserve prices and targeting rules. The API services controller is created by follow-
ing AppNexus’ format and standard thus it requires obtaining account and privileges
from AppNexus before use.
Data feed controller pulls impression level data feed from remote API services,
parse, clean, and join data to construct auctions, and save the result to database for
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Figure B.1: The modules of the prototype system. The system starts by loading optimisation
tasks. For each task, it loads data feed from remote API services and run assigned
algorithms. The result reserve price is applied by accessing remote API services
again. Additionally, the system has a simple web user interface (UI) for optimisa-
tiontaskmanagementandananalysismoduletomonitorperformanceandpossible
attrition.
Database controller provides standard create, read, update, and delete (CRUD)
functions of task conﬁgurations, data feeds, and logs.
Algorithm controller is responsible for training models for various optimisationB.3. Overview of the prototype 158
algorithms, selecting one for the current task(randomly or based on pre-assignment),
running the algorithm with auction data and parameters, and reporting the result reserve
prices. In this module we have implemented the brute force, heuristics, Bayesian learn-
ing, weighted average, and optimal auction theory algorithms. The mathematical detail
of each algorithm has been presented in Chapter 5. The code is listed in Section B.4.
Analysis controller is used for performance and possible attrition analysis. It
compares the predicted and actual uplift of revenue, revenue from the test and control
group, and reports reserve prices of each task over time. It also monitors for each task
the number of bidders, bid distribution and budget allocation of each bidder to detect
possible attrition.
Log controller saves the result reserve price for each run of optimisation, and the
remote reserve price setting after accessing API services. These logs are then used by
analysis controller for further inspection and monitoring.
Web user interface (UI) provides an intuitive interface for task management, in-
cluding creating a task, updating tasks’ conﬁgurations, activating/de-activating a task,
displaying raw logs, and displaying performance and attrition plots and reports.
B.3.2 Data ﬂow and structure
This section brieﬂy describes the data ﬂow of a single run of optimisation.
For each task, the task controller loads its conﬁguration and invokes the data feed
service API to get the auction data. Then the algorithm controller takes over, selects an
optimisation algorithm by random or pre-assignment, runs the algorithm and collects
the result, and invokes the reserve price service API to apply the result. Logs will be
generated along with a predicted optimal reserve price and saved into database.
The task controller is also responsible for querying performance reports from the
report service API (usually on a daily basis). These reports contain all placements be-
longing to the publisher including ones not in the prototype system. Those placements
not having the reserve price optimisation are control groups in evaluation. The reports
are saved into database. The analysis controller runs periodically to generate perfor-
mance and attrition report for each task by taking logs generated from the optimisation
process, as well as reports pulled from the SSP system.
The object models are summarised in Table B.1.B.4. Algorithm Implementation 159
Figure B.2: The data ﬂowchart of the prototype system. The data structure of each step is
detailed in Table B.1.
Table B.1: The structures (ﬁelds) of major data objects in the prototype system.
Data object Fields
Task conﬁguration
task id, publisher id, placement id, reserve price range, algorithm,
is active, hour targeting, geo targeting, user targeting
Auction data
auction id, timestamp, placement id, price paid, geo, user segment, a
list of <bidder id, bid price>
Result reserve price
task id, timestamp, reserve price, hour targeting, geo targeting,
user targeting
Log
task id, timestamp, reserve price rule id, reserve price, hour targeting,
geo targeting, user targeting
Report
hour, publisher id, placement id, total imps, unsold imps, clicks,
conversions, revenue
B.4 Algorithm Implementation
This section discusses the implementation of each algorithm in detail by giving code
samples and listing challenges and solutions.B.4. Algorithm Implementation 160
B.4.1 Algorithm Base
Algorithm base, or the BaseAlgorithm, is the parent class of all algorithms in the
system. SuchdesignfollowstheObjectOrienteddisciplineandmakesthesharingbasic
and common functions among algorithms easy.
A key function in BaseAlgorithm is get bids, which extracts into Numpy
arrays the ﬁrst and second highest bids and the managed bids from a list of auctions.
The managed bids are bids from the owner of the placement. If an auction fails due
to high reserve price and a managed bid is present, the impression will be won by the
owner so that it could be redirected to other ad channels for re-sell.
1 def get bid ( publisher id , grouped auction ) :
bid1 = []
3 bid2 = []
managed bid = []
5 for auction id , all bid in grouped auction :
if len ( l s t a l l b i d ) > 1:
7 bid1 . append ( float ( all bid . iloc [0][ ’ bid price ’ ]) )
else :
9 bid1 . append (0.)
11 if len ( l s t a l l b i d ) > 2:
bid2 . append ( float ( all bid . iloc [1][ ’ bid price ’ ]) )
13 else :
bid2 . append (0.)
15
df = all bid [ all bid [ ’ bidder id ’ ] == publisher id ]
17 if len ( df ) != 0:
managed bid . append ( float ( df . iloc [0][ ’ bid price ’ ]) )
19 else :
managed bid . append (0.)
21
return np . array ( bid1 ) , np . array ( bid2 ) , np . array ( managed bid )B.4. Algorithm Implementation 161
B.4.2 Brute Force Algorithm
The brute force algorithm tries to ﬁnd the optimal reserve price by exhaustive search
within the pre-deﬁned value range. The full deﬁnition of this algorithm is:
class BruteForceAlgorithm ( BaseAlgorithm ) :
2 def i n i t ( self , minimum , maximum , Ns) :
BaseAlgorithm . i n i t ( self , minimum , maximum)
4
self . Ns = Ns
6
def revenue func ( reserve price , bid1 , bid2 , managed bid ) :
8 return   np . sum( np . where ( reserve price > bid1 ,
# auction failed
10 np . where ( managed bid != 0. ,
np . amax( managed bid , self . minimum) ,
12 0.) ,
# auction succeeded
14 np . where ( reserve price > bid2 ,
reserve price ,
16 bid2 ) ) )
18 def compute ( bid1 , bid2 , managed bid ) :
bid1 , bid2 , managed bid = get bid ( seller id , grouped auction )
20 ret = optimize . brute ( func=revenue func ,
ranges =(( self . minimum , self .maximum) , ) ,
22 args =( bid1 , bid2 , managed bid , self . minimum , ) ,
Ns= self .Ns , # number of i t e r a t i o n s
24 full output =True ,
finish =None ,
26 disp=False )
28 reserve price = float ( ret [0])
30 # revenue curve for further analysis
x = ret [2]
32 y = ret [3]B.4. Algorithm Implementation 162
34 return reserve price , x , y
Note that np is an alias for the Numpy library.
The revenue func function returns a negative value for the ease of using opti-
misation libraries, since most of them try to ﬁnd the minimum instead of the maximum.
As shown in the function body, the compute function also returns the revenue
curve for the current auction data. A revenue curve is a series of reserve price with cor-
responding revenue (negative value in our case). Such curves are useful in performance
analysis, e.g., sharp-shaped revenue curves require conservative prediction since failed
auctions incur great loss to the publisher.
B.4.3 Heuristic Algorithm
The heuristic algorithm tries to ﬁnd the optimal reserve price by iterating over auction
data once, and adjust the reserve price after each auction according to parameters’ set
up. The full deﬁnition of this algorithms is:
class HeuristicAlgorithm ( BaseAlgorithm ) :
2 def i n i t ( self , minimum , maximum , scale low , scale match ,
scale high , decay ) :
BaseAlgorithm . i n i t ( self , minimum , maximum)
4
self . scale low = scale low
6 self . scale match = scale match
self . scale high = scale high
8 self . decay = decay
10 def compute ( self , bid1 , bid2 , managed bid ) :
reserve price = minimum
12
for b1 , b2 , managed b in zip ( bid1 , bid2 , managed bid ) :
14 reserve price = step ( reserve price , b1 , b2 , count )
count += 1
16
return max(min( reserve price , self .maximum) , self . minimum)
18
def step ( self , reserve price , b1 , b2 ) :B.4. Algorithm Implementation 163
20 if reserve price < b2 :
# too low
22 reserve price *= (1 + self . scale low * self . decay ** count )
e l i f b2 <= reserve price <= b1 :
24 # desirable
reserve price *= (1 + self . scale match * self . decay ** count )
26 e l i f reserve price > b1 :
# too high
28 reserve price *= (1   self . scale high * self . decay ** count )
30 return reserve price
B.4.4 Optimal Auction Theory Algorithm
The optimal auction theory algorithm tries to ﬁnd the optimal reserve price by ﬁtting
bids from auction data into a Log-normal distribution, and then solving Equation 5.2.
The full deﬁnition of the algorithm is:
class OptimalAuctionTheoryAlgorithm ( BaseAlgorithm ) :
2 def i n i t ( self , minimum , maximum) :
BaseAlgorithm . i n i t ( self , minimum , maximum)
4
def value func ( self , x) :
6 pdf val = self . log norm pdf (x)
pdf d val = self . log norm pdf d (x)
8
# we want this to be 0
10 return x   (1   pdf val ) / pdf d val   self . minimum
12 def log norm pdf ( self , x) :
return ( math . exp( ( self . log mean   x) ** 2 / (2 * self . sd **
2) ) /
14 ( self . sd * x * math . sqrt (2 * math . pi ) ) )
16 def log norm pdf d ( self , x) :
return (  self . log norm pdf (x) / x  
18 self . log norm pdf (x) *
( math . log (x)   math . exp ( self . log mean ) ) /B.4. Algorithm Implementation 164
20 (x * self . sd ** 2) )
22 def compute ( self , grouped auction ) :
bid = []
24 for auction in grouped auction :
bid . extend ([ i [ ” bid price ” ] for i in auction ])
26
sd , loc , log mean = s t a t s . lognorm . f i t ( data=bid , floc =0)
28
res = minimize scalar ( fun= self . value func ,
30 bounds =( self . minimum , self .maximum) ,
method=”bounded” )
32
return math . log ( res . x)
B.4.5 Weighted Average Algorithm
The weighted average algorithm looks back at revenue reports and tries to ﬁnd a reserve
price by averaging historical payoffs. The historical payoffs are discounted by weights
since the algorithm believes a more recent report is more important. Weights follow
either a linear or an exponential scale. The full deﬁnition of the algorithm is:
1 class WeightedAverageAlgorithm ( BaseAlgorithm ) :
# weight type
3 LINEAR = 1
EXPONENTIAL = 2 # base e
5
def i n i t ( self , minimum , maximum , window length , weight type =
LINEAR) :
7 BaseAlgorithm . i n i t ( self , minimum , maximum)
9 self . window length = window length
self . weight type = weight type
11
def compute ( self , recent payoff ) :
13 # make sure we use the correct window size
actual size = min( len ( recent payoff ) , self . window length )
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weight base = 0.
17 cumulative = 0.
19 for idx in range ( len ( recent payoff ) ,
len ( recent payoff )   actual size ,
21   1) :
if self . weight type == WeightedAverageAlgorithm .LINEAR:
23 weight base += idx
cumulative += idx * recent payoff [ idx   1]
25 else :
weight base += math . exp ( idx + actual size   len (
recent payoff ) )
27 cumulative += math . exp ( idx + actual size   len (
recent payoff ) ) * recent payoff [ idx   1]
29 if weight base == 0.:
reserve price = 0.
31 else :
reserve price = cumulative / weight base
33
return reserve price
B.4.6 Bayesian Learning Algorithm
The Bayesian learning algorithm has two variations. They try to ﬁnd a reserve price
by ﬁtting bids from auction data to a univariant or a bivariant Log-normal distribution.
For the univariant case, the reserve price is taken as the mean of the distribution; for
the bivariant case, the reserve price is set to the value that maximise the probability of
being within two means. The full deﬁnition of the algorithm is:
class BayesianLearningUnivariantAlgorithm ( BaseAlgorithm ) :
2 def i n i t ( self , minimum , maximum , theta , delta , sigma ) :
BaseAlgorithm . i n i t ( self , minimum , maximum)
4
self . theta = theta
6 self . delta = delta
self . sigma = sigma
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def compute ( self , bid ) :
10 self . theta = ( self . theta * self . delta +
bid * self . sigma ) / ( self . sigma + self . delta )
12 self . delta = ( self . delta * self . sigma ) / n
( self . sigma + self . delta )
14
reserve price = self . theta
16
return max(min( reserve price , self .maximum) , self . minimum)
18
class BayesLearningBivariantAlgorithm ( BaseAlgorithm ) :
20 def i n i t ( self , minimum , maximum ,
m1, v log1 , v normal1 ,
22 m2, v log2 , v normal2 ) :
24 BaseAlgorithm . i n i t ( self , minimum , maximum)
26 self .m1 = m1
self . v normal1 = v normal1
28 self . v log1 = v log1
30 self .m2 = m2
self . v normal2 = v normal2
32 self . v log2 = v log2
34
def bayesian inference ( self , m, v normal , v log , x) :
36 new v normal = 1 / v normal + 1 / v log
new m = (m / v normal + x / v log ) / new v normal
38
return new m , new v normal
40
def lognormal pdf ( self , x , m, var ) :
42 sd = math . sqrt ( var )
return ( math . exp( (m   math . log (x) ) ** 2 /
44 (2 * sd ** 2) ) /
( sd * x * math . sqrt (2 * math . pi ) ) )
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def lognormal cdf ( self , x , m, var ) :
48 return 0.5 + 0.5 * erf (( math . log (x)   m) /
math . sqrt (2 * var ) )
50
def object function ( self , x) :
52 return  ( self . lognormal cdf (x , self .m1,
self . v normal1 ) *
54 (1  
self . lognormal cdf (x , self .m2,
56 self . v normal2 ) ) )
58 def compute ( self , bid1 , bid2 ) :
( self .m1,
60 self . v normal1 ) = n
self . bayesian inference ( self .m1,
62 self . v normal1 ,
self . v log1 ,
64 bid1 )
( self .m2,
66 self . v normal2 ) = n
self . bayesian inference ( self .m2,
68 self . v normal2 ,
self . v log2 ,
70 bid2 )
72 op result = n
minimize scalar ( fun= self . object function ,
74 bounds =( self . minimum , self .maximum) ,
method=”bounded” )
76
reserve price = math . log ( op result . x)
78
return reserve priceB.5. Quick User Manual 168
B.4.7 Zero Algorithm
The zero algorithm always returns the minimum possible value within the pre-
conﬁgured range. The full deﬁnition of the algorithms is:
1 class ZeroAlgorithm ( BaseAlgorithm ) :
def i n i t ( self , minimum , maximum) :
3 BaseAlgorithm . i n i t ( self , minimum , maximum)
5 def compute ( self ) :
return self . minimum
B.5 Quick User Manual
This section lists critical steps of setting up the environment and the prototype system.
More detailed information about each step could be found above in this Appendix.
1. To create a Linux server instance with good capacity. For 30 optimisation tasks
with a random mixture of all available algorithms, we recommend an Amazon
EC2 m3.large instance or its equivalent;
2. To install Python 2 and required libraries. Python is usually supplied with the
Linux OS. However, if you do not have it yet you can install it by running
sudo apt get i n s t a l l python2
Note that apt-get or yum could be the package manager depending on your
Linux OS distribution.
To install the required libraries, you need to run
1 pip i n s t a l l numpy scipy matplotlib pandas scikit  learn requests
web . py MySQL Python
Depending on the Linux OS distribution, you may be able to install some of the
libraries supplied with the OS, for example,
1 sudo apt get i n s t a l l python numpy python scipyB.5. Quick User Manual 169
Alternatively, you can choose to install Anaconda distribution which contains
Python and most of required libraries, for example
1 bash Anaconda  2.x . x Linux x86 [ 64 ] . sh
3. To install MySQL DB, then create a database, create a user with password, and
grant the privileges, for example in MySQL’s admin console,
1 CREATE DATABASE ‘ optimisation ‘;
CREATE USER ’ jeffrey ’@’ localhost ’ IDENTIFIED BY ’mypass ’ ;
3 GRANT ALL ON ‘ optimisation ‘ TO ’ jeffrey ’@’ localhost ’ ;
4. To clone the source code of the system from https://github.com/
shuaiyuancn/rtb-reserve-price-opt into a convenient location, for
example,
1 cd / workspace
git clone git@github .com: shuaiyuancn / rtb reserve  price opt . git
5. To edit the mysql wrapper.py for the correct DB details as created above;
6. To edit the API credentials in api func.py;
7. To start the Web UI by running
cd / workspace / rtb reserve  price opt
2 python www/ server . py 8080
Then you can access the Web UI via http://SERVER-IP:8080B.5. Quick User Manual 170
8. To create an optimisation task, for example,
Figure B.3: The interface for adding an optimisation task in the Web UI.
9. Then the task will run automatically every hour.